

**A REPORT ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
OF WESTERN EUROPE**

LETTER

FROM

**ACTING CHAIRMAN, THE U.S. ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS**

TRANSMITTING

**A REPORT ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN
EUROPE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 107 OF PUBLIC LAW 87-256**

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION,
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,
September 23, 1964.

Hon. JOHN W. McCORMACK,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In accordance with section 107 of Public Law 87-256, which provides that the Commission may make special reports to the Congress as it deems these appropriate, we submit herewith a report by Walter Adams, a Commission member and professor of economics at Michigan State University.

This report is entitled "On the Strategic Importance of Western Europe—a Report to the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural affairs."

The Commission itself touched upon the importance of educational exchange and cultural relations with Western Europe in its recent annual report to the Congress. There it stated that any "slackening of educational and cultural efforts in Western Europe would be contrary to the interests of the United States." This report by Walter Adams may be considered a further expansion of these views, but it should be noted that this is a report to the Commission and further that not all Commission members agree with all parts of the report nor, in fact, do all agree with the tenor of the entire report. Further, some Commission members wish to state that the views expressed here should not, in their opinion, be construed to mean that this Government should not strengthen its educational and cultural programs in Africa and other underdeveloped areas of the world.

Nevertheless, the Commission wishes to call the attention of the Congress and interested persons in the public to Dr. Adams' views in the belief that their publication will encourage further constructive study of the issues and will be helpful in advancing our country's interests through international educational and cultural programs.

Sincerely yours,

ROY E. LARSEN, *Acting Chairman.*

Enclosure: Report

**U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL
AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS**

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Staff Director**

ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN EUROPE— A REPORT TO THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER- NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

(By Walter Adams)

The proper role of U.S. educational, cultural, and information programs has been the subject of periodic controversy among statesmen and scholars alike. Some contend that these programs are an end in themselves, carrying their own justification, both transcending, and independent of, U.S. foreign policy. They regard educational aid to underdeveloped countries, for example, as nothing more than the "fulfillment of an obligation of the few rich nations toward the many poor ones," and insist that this effort be as nonpolitical as possible.

Others believe that our educational and cultural effort overseas is, or could be made to be, a valuable adjunct to U.S. foreign policy. They see great pragmatic advantage in bringing foreigners to the United States, exposing them to our way of life, and thus having them become a mighty force for better understanding between their nations and ours. Such understanding, they suggest, will mean affection for Americans as a people, support for our foreign policy, and a contribution to world peace. This group also seeks to minimize the purely "political" overtones in U.S. cultural diplomacy.

A third group rejects the very notion of educational and cultural exchange programs. It views such programs as "a gigantic boondoggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations."¹

These variously quixotic, folkloric, and simplistic conceptions stand in marked contrast to a fourth position, recently articulated—with insightful realism and refreshing candor—by a Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives. "While we do not want to see educational exchanges turned into indoctrination efforts on the Soviet model," said the subcommittee, "we believe that it is time to reexamine and acknowledge the naivete of certain assumptions which have influenced the conduct of these undertakings. We refuse to believe that the people of other countries * * * consider these programs unrelated to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy and therefore completely devoid of political motivations."² The "fuzziness of concept" which sometimes plagues these programs could be eliminated, said the subcommittee, if we frankly acknowledged the political component in all overseas activities of the U.S. Government—including the educational and cultural.

This view of cultural diplomacy as a "third dimension of U.S. foreign policy"—a view which incidentally is the basic assumption underlying the following report—is based on an unambiguous concept of foreign

¹ The foregoing alternatives, but with respect to foreign aid, are discussed in a hard-headed, unromantic article by Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," in Novack and Lakachman (editors), *Development and Society*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, pp. 348 ff.

² U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, "Ideological Operations and Foreign Policy," H. Rept. 1352, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, p. 10.

relations. According to this concept, "The primary task of the foreign policy of the United States is to advance our national objectives in the world. The broad outlines of our foreign policy are shaped with this purpose in mind. The conduct of U.S. diplomacy and our various operations abroad are keyed to the attainment of that goal. The choice of instruments—military power, economic aid, trade, and others—and the manner in which they are employed are determined by the nature of our objectives and the obstacles which have to be overcome in attaining them."³

In this view (and that of Professor Morgenthau also), U.S. foreign policy has only one paramount goal (the national interest), and the different means toward that end (diplomacy, military policy, economic policy, cultural policy, etc.) are all "weapons in the *political* armory of the Nation."⁴ [Emphasis added.]

The coordination of cultural diplomacy with, or its subordination to, the national interest does not, of course, mean indulgence in short-run (i.e., shortsighted) and propagandistic (i.e., self-defeating) attempts at political manipulation (i.e., brainwashing). Such attempts are usually brazen, clumsy, transparent, distasteful, and hence unconvincing. Aside from their dubious morality, they fail to confer any pragmatic advantage. When a representative of the United States tries to "explain away" Little Rock or Birmingham, McCarthyism or Minutemen, missile gaps or moonshot fizzles, poverty or lagging growth rates, he is not engaging in cultural diplomacy properly conceived—nor, for that matter, is he striking a very powerful blow for the national interest. Propaganda makes for ineffectual cultural diplomacy.

On the other hand, cultural diplomacy can frankly acknowledge its national interest component and still be effective. France, for example, has never denied her aspiration to serve as a cultural missionary in the world. Her self-image as the guardian of human civilization, dating back to the Crusades and the noble Christian idea of *gesta Dei per Francos*,⁵ is constantly reiterated in the reports of the French Foreign Office and was most recently articulated by André Malraux, the Minister of Cultural Affairs. In a stirring appeal, he urged France to shoulder the burden for man's cultural destiny—asserting that France must bring man the means of defending himself against the death of civilization, because "otherwise nobody else will do it."⁶ To the extent that this view is translated into the worldwide teaching of the French language, the introduction of French civilization courses in the curriculums of foreign schools, the global distribution of French books and periodicals, etc., it can be called a rational approach to cultural diplomacy—without concealment of its national origin or national purpose. Indeed, the Tunisian Government's request for more French teachers, at the very moment that Tunisian troops are fighting the French at the Bizerte Naval Base, is a tribute to the effectiveness of French cultural diplomacy as an arm of the national interest.

In short, there is no inherent dichotomy between cultural programs that serve the national interest and those that have an essential

³ Id., p. 1.

⁴ Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

⁵ Herbert Luethy, "France Against Herself," cited in the excellent article by W. McNeil Lowry and Gertrude S. Hooker, "The Role of the Arts and Humanities," in Robert Blum (editor), *Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963, p. 45.

⁶ "Appeal by Malraux Stirs Deputies," *New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1963.

validity of their own. In practice, these goals of cultural diplomacy tend to coalesce rather than conflict, because only programs conceived and administered with unimpeachable academic integrity and conforming to the highest standards of professional excellence are capable of promoting the national interest. Cultural diplomacy in this sense is an indispensable part of the U.S. posture in the world; and its effectiveness must be measured—as that of any component of our international diplomacy—by the extent to which it promotes the national interest. That, at least, is the basic assumption on which the following report is based.

Given this assumption, is it wise to deemphasize Western Europe in the allocation of Government funds for international educational and cultural affairs?

That such deemphasis has in fact occurred is not open to question. With the rapid increase in the number of new nations, and the assignment of high priorities to “non-Western” areas, there has been a trend since 1956 toward ever sharper reductions of educational and cultural programs in Western Europe. “By 1961,” according to knowledgeable observers, “USIS posts in Western Europe had lost one-third of their American staff and nearly two-fifths of their local employees; the share of USIA funds expended in Western Europe had declined from about 20 to less than 13 percent. In 1962 a reduction of \$550,000 caused the sharpest decrease to date in cultural (as well as information) activities; for 1963 a further 10-percent reduction was planned. Meanwhile, the diversion of resources from Europe affects not only the size of the effort but above all its quality. Since 1960 it has been USIA policy to assign many of its most mature and sophisticated officers to other priority areas, especially tropical Africa. With Europe thus downgraded, it has followed inevitably that some of the most sensitive and challenging European assignments have fallen to persons who in no sense represent the best the United States (or the USIA) has to offer.”⁷

Unfortunately, this “downgrading” of Western Europe is not based on “assumptions that were valid *either* for intercultural objectives or for foreign policy considerations.” On the contrary, careful appraisal of the facts would lead to the conclusion that “our international cultural activities should be expanded, and primarily in Western Europe.”⁸

There are at least six reasons for this conclusion:

(1) Western Europe, unlike the underdeveloped areas of the world, is a crucial geopolitical and economic factor in the international balance of power.

(2) The economic gap between Western Europe and the underdeveloped nations is likely to widen in the foreseeable future, thus enhancing rather than diminishing its relative importance as an economic and political power bloc.

(3) Western Europe is a keystone in the military alliances forged by the United States on a global scale.

(4) Western Europe is destined to play an increasingly significant role in the economic organizations of the free world, and in the provision of economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

⁷ Lowry and Hooker, *op. cit.*, p. 72. With respect to CU activities, it is true that there have been only minor variations in the exchange-of-persons budget for Western Europe between July 1, 1960, and June 30, 1964. However, it is also true that the same money does not have the same purchasing power it had 5 years ago.

⁸ *Id.*, p. 78.

(5) Western Europe is a cultural force of major significance in many underdeveloped nations, especially the former colonies.

(6) Given the limited "absorptive" capacity of many underdeveloped areas, Western Europe offers a greater payoff potential (from the point of view of the United States) for a major educational and cultural effort.

(7) Despite some solid achievements, U.S. educational and cultural programs in Western Europe have not had as great an impact as is commonly assumed, and the effort now underway must be continued to achieve meaningful and lasting results.

(1) *Western Europe, unlike the underdeveloped areas of the world, is a crucial geopolitical and economic factor in the international balance of power.*

Under international law, all sovereign nations are equal. But some are more equal than others in terms of the extent and position of their territory, their human and natural resources, their economic and technological strength—in short, their potential for forging the sinews of peace and war. And, it is this potential which largely determines a nation's ability to exercise power and to influence the course of international events. It is this potential which largely determines whether a nation's ideals and aspirations can survive and prevail in a power-oriented world arena.

Together with Russia and China, the United States and Western Europe constitute the four dominant power blocs in the world today. Considered as a unit, the Atlantic Community forms a vast producing and consuming area in which live 450 million of the world's "most developed" peoples. These people constitute less than one-sixth of the world's population, but command roughly two-thirds of its productive capacity, and help to make this Atlantic Community the strongest economic combine in the world.

Tables I, II, and III present some indicia of Western Europe's economic importance. The area's steel production is roughly equal to that of the United States, on the one hand, and that of Eastern Europe (Red bloc), on the other. (See table I.) It is 3 times greater than that of the Far East and 50 times greater than that of Africa. When we consider the fact that the totals for Africa are, with the exception of 108,000 tons, the output of the Union of South Africa; when we consider the fact that Japan accounts for 80 percent of the Far East's output, and that its production is 6 times greater than that of India—the divergence between Western Europe and the underdeveloped world looms even larger.

The same contrast between Western Europe and the underdeveloped world is shown in table II comparing the production of electricity. The totals for Western Europe are almost 4 times greater than those of Asia, and 14 times greater than those of Africa. What is more important, perhaps, the gap between these totals does not seem to be narrowing. Indeed, it is widening.

Finally, table III presents an overall view of the rapid growth in Western Europe's economy and the affluence of her people between 1952 and 1962. All that needs to be added by way of underscoring intercontinental comparisons is that the typical per capita income in most African nations is roughly \$100 annually—in contrast to \$966 in the European Economic Community, \$922 in Western Europe, and \$2,433 in the United States.

No wonder, then, that seasoned political scientists advocate a "policy that places the Atlantic Community above all other American international objectives";⁹ that Gen. Lauris Norstad finds in the Atlantic Community "the great reservoir of moral and material resources of intellect, science, and of the political, economic, social, industrial, and cultural development necessary to accelerate the progress of the less developed nations";¹⁰ that President Kennedy, as late as June 1963, concluded that the "future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership—a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose people can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world. Some say this is only a dream, but I do not agree," the late President told us. "There will be difficulties and delays, and doubts, and discouragement. There will be differences of approach and opinion. But we have the will and the means to serve three related goals—the heritage of our countries, the unity of our continents, and the interdependence of the Western Alliance."¹¹

Such pleas for Atlantic partnership are a clear recognition of Western Europe's political and economic strength—its command over manpower and material, industrial potential and technology, without which the U.S. position of world leadership would become infinitely more complicated and difficult.

⁹ Robert Strausz-Hupé, James E. Dougherty, and William R. Kintner, "The Atlantic Vision: A Question of Choice," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, fall 1963, p. 328.

¹⁰ Lauris Norstad, "The Future of the Atlantic Community," *id.*, p. 348.

¹¹ President John F. Kennedy, address in Frankfurt, Germany, June 25, 1963.

TABLE I.—*World production of steel*

[In thousands of net tons]

Area	1961	1962 ¹	Area	1961	1962 ¹
United States.....	98,014	98,328	Far East.....	35,942	30,266
Canada.....	6,466	7,173	Far East (Red bloc).....	14,055	9,957
Latin America.....	5,883	6,495	Oceania.....	4,414	4,750
ECSC.....	80,739	80,112			
Other Western Europe.....	38,404	39,743	Total, free world.....	272,945	273,130
Eastern Europe (Red bloc).....	103,062	111,167	Total, Red bloc.....	117,117	121,124
Africa.....	2,833	2,998			
Middle East.....	250	265	Total, world.....	390,062	394,254

¹ Estimate.

Source: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report, 1962.

TABLE II.—*Production of electricity*

[In billion kilowatt-hours]

World area	1937	1950	1957
World total.....	449	951	2,210
Europe without U.S.S.R.....	172	299	534
Western Europe.....	143	260	443
U.S.S.R.....	36	90	209
Canada and United States.....	178	444	806
Africa.....	6	14	30
Asia without U.S.S.R.....	42	68	126
Latin America.....	10	22	36
Oceania.....	5	14	26

Source: United Nations, "Supplement to World Economic Report, 1950-51," United Nations, Statistical Yearbook: 1958, New York, 1959, p. 265.

TABLE III.—*The rapidly growing European Market*

	National income (billions of U.S. dollars)		Per capita income (U.S. dollars)		Automobiles (per thousand population)		TV sets (per thousand population)		Radios (per thousand population)		Telephones (per thousand population)	
	1952	1962	1952	1962	1952	1962	1952	1962	1952	1962	1952	1962
EEC.....	72.6	169.3	459	966	26	88	-----	78	176	258	55	105
Western Europe.....	135.4	288.3	472	922	28	81	7	98	176	241	72	121
United States.....	292.2	453.7	1,855	2,433	279	339	133	311	698	925	305	415

Source: The Chase Manhattan Bank, "The European Markets," January 1964, p. 32.

(2) *The economic gap between Western Europe and the underdeveloped nations is likely to widen in the foreseeable future, thus enhancing rather than diminishing its relative importance as an economic and political power bloc.*

The gospel according to St. Matthew teaches that, "For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath" (25: 29).

This is an early articulation of the principle of cumulative causation, and students of economic development have found that it applies not only to individuals but to nations. Prof. Ragnar Nurske, for example, explains "the vicious circle of poverty" as follows:

The concept implies, of course, a circular constellation of forces tending to act and react upon one another in such a way as to keep a poor country in a state of poverty. Particular instances of such circular constellations are not difficult to imagine. For example, a poor man may not have enough to eat; being undernourished, his health may be weak; being physically weak, his working capacity may be low, which means that he is poor, which in turn means that he will not have enough to eat; and so on. A situation of this sort, applying to a country as a whole, can be summed up in the trite proposition: "A country is poor because it is poor."¹²

"Nothing succeeds like success," Americans are fond of saying; but the same principle applies in reverse: "Nothing fails like failure." Seldom, as Prof. Gunnar Myrdal points out, are there any tendencies toward automatic self-stabilization in a socioeconomic system:

The system is by itself not moving toward any sort of balance between forces, but is constantly on the move away from such a situation. In the normal case a change does not call forth countervailing changes but, instead, supporting changes, which move the system in the same direction as the first change but much further. Because of such circular causation a social process tends to become cumulative and often to gather speed at an accelerating rate.¹³

It is this principle of cumulative causation which explains why the gap between advanced industrial nations in Western Europe, on the one hand, and the underdeveloped nations, on the other, is widening, and likely to continue widening in the foreseeable future. What W. W. Rostow calls "takeoff into sustained growth"¹⁴—a

¹² "Some Aspects of Capital Accumulation in Underdeveloped Countries," Cairo, 1952, quoted in Gunnar Myrdal, "Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions," London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1957, p. 11. John Kenneth Galbraith puts the same point in a less pessimistic cast: "On occasion they blame those that follow for their poor performance. And to those that follow, progress must often seem disappointing. It would be well were we all to realize that if the pace of less favorably situated countries is slow it is not necessarily because their efforts are less. Most likely it is because their task is so much greater." ("Economic Development in Perspective," Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 13).

¹³ Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ "The Stages of Economic Growth," Cambridge: The University Press, 1959.

nation's attempt to lift itself by its bootstraps—is no mean task, and the chances for success are probably overestimated by romantic and utopian optimists.

Thus, it is erroneous to analogize the developmental process which took place in Europe with that which now confronts the underdeveloped world. Some nations may be permanently condemned to underdevelopment because of their poverty in natural resources. Others probably require a heroic transformation and modernization of their manpower and its *Weltanschauung* before approaching even the threshold of the "takeoff" stage. Others, as Hans Morgenthau observes, are—

still awaiting the equivalent of the moral and intellectual revolutions which in the 16th and 17th centuries created the cultural preconditions for the economic development of the West. Yet we tend to take the existence of these preconditions for granted, forgetting that without the secularization and rationalization of Western thought and society the industrialization of the West would not have been possible.¹⁵

Moreover, Professor Morgenthau points out—

since Western economic development, from the first industrial revolution onward, has been due to the formation of capital and the accumulation of technical knowledge, we have tended to assume that these two factors would by themselves provide the impetus for the economic development of the underdeveloped nations. * * * This tendency has been powerfully supported by the spectacular success of the Marshall plan. * * * Yet it is not always recognized that this success was made possible only by the fact that, in contrast to the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the recipients of Marshall aid were among the leading industrial nations of the world, whose economic systems were but temporarily in disarray.¹⁶

For our purposes here, it is not necessary to examine in detail the various theories of economic development. Enough has been said to justify the conclusion that the advanced industrialized nations of Western Europe today constitute an economic and geopolitical bloc of primary importance in the world arena, and that the present gap between this bloc and the underdeveloped nations—despite heroic efforts which may be undertaken to narrow it—is likely to widen in the foreseeable future. In other words, the relative importance of Western Europe in the coming decades will increase rather than diminish—a fact which cannot be ignored in the formulation of U.S. policy either with respect to Western Europe or the underdeveloped nations. (In this connection, see also the discussion of proposition No. 4, *infra*.)

(3) *Western Europe is a keystone in the military alliance forged by the United States on a global scale.*

NATO is an obvious example of such an alliance, but SEATO and CENTO as well would be unthinkable without the cooperation of the major West European powers.

To be sure, the Atlantic alliance is plagued by uncertainty and tension—over nuclear strategy and command, over customs duties and protectionism, over negotiations with the Soviet Union, over policy toward Cuba, over relations with mainland China, and over the course of the wars in southeast Asia. There are disagreements between the United States and her European partners, and dissension among the Europeans themselves. Greece and Turkey are close to

¹⁵ Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

¹⁶ *Id.*, p. 355.

armed conflict over Cyprus, and France is intransigent in blocking Britain's entry into the Common Market.

Nevertheless, the Atlantic partnership provides a framework for resolving conflicts on an intracommunity basis while preserving the essentials for a united stand against potentially hostile outsiders. Moreover, despite the conflicting interests on particular issues which may sometimes divide allies, there is a common bond among them. And this bond can be cemented and reinforced by cultural diplomacy, where the more conventional forms of diplomacy are perhaps less successful.

(4) Western Europe is destined to play an increasingly significant role in the economic organizations of the free world, and the provision of economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is probably the most important economic organization binding together the nations of the Atlantic community. It has 20 members, including all the NATO countries, plus Austria, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In addition, it counts Finland, Yugoslavia, and Japan among its associate members, which indicates the economic attraction of this, the largest of Atlantic organizations. Not only does OECD undertake efforts to insure monetary stability and liquidity in the Western World, but it is becoming an increasingly important vehicle for providing economic aid and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas.

OECD has also concerned itself with science and education as dynamos for economic growth and development. In the nuclear energy field, for example, both the European Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD (ENEA) and EURATOM (whose members are the countries of the Common Market) have sponsored important research programs for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In education, the OECD Mediterranean regional program is making available to decisionmakers in the Governments of Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia assessments of the investments in education which will be necessary by 1970 and 1975 if economic expansion targets and social goals are to be achieved.

Another economic organization, the European Economic Community or Common Market (EEC), is significant in this connection because of the special association it maintains with those non-European nations which in the past were colonies of its member states. Most of these are on the African Continent, and include such new countries as Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togoland, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, the Congo, etc. Under the Treaty of Rome, the EEC is gradually abolishing, over a 12-year transition period, all tariff and quota restrictions on imports from these new nations, which in turn are extending to the whole Community any preferential terms they formerly granted to any of its members. The EEC also set up a European Development Fund to aid these underdeveloped countries, and this fund appropriated \$581,250,000 for the first 5 years of the Community's existence. In addition, it has offered these African nations technical assistance in a variety of forms.

Individually and collectively, the nations of Western Europe have assumed a steadily growing responsibility for economic aid and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. "In recent years,"

according to David E. Bell, Director of AID, "Western Europe and Japan have doubled the amount of their economic aid, from \$1.2 billion in 1956 to \$2.4 billion in 1962. In 1962, of total governmental economic aid from all the advanced countries, the United States provided about 60 percent, and the other countries about 40 percent. This was approximately the same proportion as the ratio of the U.S. national product to the national product of all the other countries. (There are, indeed, three or four countries which are putting a larger share of their national product into foreign aid than we are.)"¹⁷

With respect to the African nations in particular, Prof. Frank Munk reports:

France, and the Common Market as a whole are to play a major role in the economic development of these African states by direct aid on a substantial scale and by furnishing economic assistance. It is not generally realized in the United States that French foreign aid alone is 2½ times higher per capita than that provided by the United States. This figure is all the more significant because American aid is scattered all around the globe, whereas French aid is given exclusively to the countries maintaining a special relationship to France and these are also the countries associated with the EEC. It is evident that an Atlantic Community could furnish aid on a massive scale since its members represent just about every affluent society in the world as well as being possessors of the most efficient industrial and agricultural productive organization.¹⁸

The Clay Committee on Foreign Aid came to substantially the same conclusion. It, too, felt that Western Europe—either alone or in partnership with the United States—should be the primary instrument for extending economic aid and technical assistance to the new nations of Africa. Said the Committee:

* * * the new countries of Africa in most cases have maintained close ties with the former metropolises without impairment of their full independence, and the latter in turn have displayed considerable willingness to help meet the assistance needs of these young nations. The Committee regards Africa as an area where the Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden. In fact, this is proving to be the case. Almost all nations formerly under French aegis are now receiving heavy French assistance, largely in grants. We welcome this present arrangement, based on past relationship, and trust it will continue. Similarly, the new nations formerly under British rule should look largely to the United Kingdom for economic assistance, and we hope that this experienced nation will continue to provide it. The new Overseas Development Fund of the European Economic Community also should prove a major source of help.¹⁹

In short, the economic partnership of the Atlantic Community is not only important as a bond between the United States and Western Europe, but is in the process of becoming a significant instrument for extending economic aid and technical assistance to the underdeveloped nations, especially in Africa.

(5) *Western Europe is a cultural force of major significance in many underdeveloped nations, especially the former colonies.*

It is an undisputed fact that, during the colonial era, the native elites of Asia and Africa received their intellectual and cultural conditioning in the academies of Western Europe. The men who led the struggle for political independence became, once this goal had

¹⁷ David E. Bell, "The Foreign Aid Program Today," New York Times magazine, Sept. 1, 1963.

¹⁸ Frank Munk, "The Atlantic Community and World Community," address at the 9th Annual Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Chicago, Oct. 23-26, 1963.

¹⁹ Report to the President of the United States from the Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free World (Clay Committee), "The Scope of Distribution of U.S. Military and Economic Assistance Programs," Mar. 20, 1963.

been achieved, the dominant groups in the political, economic, and cultural life of the new nations.

It is also true that the deep and bitter resentment of political colonialism never extended to educational and cultural affairs. Indeed, the old colonial powers have retained (and perhaps even strengthened) their cultural influence in the erstwhile possessions. We have already mentioned the Tunisian call for French teachers at the very moment Tunisian troops were fighting the French at the Bizerte naval base. Educational philosophy and practice at the University of Dakar are indistinguishable from what prevails in any French mainland university. The curriculum and methods at the University of Bombay are not very different from those at the University of London. Taste in art, music, and literature—with some native adaptation—is patterned after that of the old mother country. Raymond Aron, therefore, may not be far off the mark in suggesting that, "Whether one likes it or dislikes it, welcomes or deplures it, the fact remains that the 'clerks' of Paris still play a role in the world and radiate an influence out of proportion to the place that France occupies on the map."²⁰ The same can be said of the influence radiated by the "clerks" of London, and probably those of Brussels and The Hague. The erstwhile colonies have tended to retain their affinity for European education and culture—with a determination that is sometimes "*plus royaliste que le Roi*."

Moreover, the former colonies have not only been anxious to import the culture of the old motherland, but also the latter's evaluation of other cultures, especially that of the United States. And today, the spokesmen for the new nations frequently report that their views of the United States "originated with or have been confirmed by European intellectuals, especially in France but often in Great Britain."²¹ In other words, they often see America through European eyes.

This tendency is not likely to be reversed in the near future. Given the strong cultural (as well as economic) bonds between Western Europe and the "emerging" nations (especially in Africa, but also in Asia), the most promising young students in the underdeveloped countries are still drawn, almost irresistibly, to seek a European education. And the Europeans have made a great effort to train specialists from the underdeveloped countries by providing scholarships and offering special courses. During the academic year 1962-63, for example, the Common Market alone offered some 1,000 scholarships to citizens of the "associated" countries. Indeed, it is not unfair to suggest that the cream of the African student crop can probably be found in the universities of Great Britain, France, and Germany, rather than in their own countries.

The implications for U.S. policy, therefore, seem clear. If we want to have some impact on the image of the United States retained by these students, we must work through the European institutions which happen to be their hosts. Also, if we are to recruit talented and promising future leaders for a firsthand exposure to American

²⁰ "The Opium of the Intellectuals," quoted in Lowry and Hooker, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

²¹ "As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes," cited by Lowry and Hooker, *op. cit.* p. 66. English-speaking Africans, says Ezekiel Mphahlele, an African writer born in South Africa and now living in Kenya, "have a high regard for British educational institutions, of which they are products, and a traditional distrust for American education * * *". This is particularly so because British educators and administrators have played no mean role in instilling this distrust of American education." ("The Fabric of African Cultures," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1964, p. 620).

education and culture, the best place to find them may be Western Europe rather than their native lands.

(6) *Given the limited "absorptive" capacity of many underdeveloped areas, Western Europe offers a greater payoff potential (from the point of view of the United States) for a major educational and cultural effort.*

In a world of limited resources, the demand for them almost always exceeds their supply. And this makes it necessary to ration the scarce resources among competing uses, each of which may be worthwhile and desirable in itself, but all of which cannot be satisfied at the same time. Hence choices must be made, and rational choices consist of allocating resources to those uses where their employment is most fruitful—that is, where they can produce the best results. Put differently, limited funds must be invested in such a manner as to maximize the rate of return; i.e., the payoff on the investment.

In judging the "profitability" (wisdom) of an overseas investment, one prime consideration is the "absorptive capacity" of the recipient nation. Thus, it would be wasteful to build a superhighway in a country which hardly has any automobiles. It would be foolish to construct a television transmitter, complete with regional relay stations, in a land where only a handful of people have TV receivers. It would be unproductive to build and staff a university in a nation with a 99 percent illiteracy rate. In other words, certain forms of international assistance—economic, educational, or cultural—may be doomed to failure, simply because they are not geared, either in scope or in kind, to the needs of the receiving nation.

In the educational and cultural field, for example, one might decide for reasons of idealism, equity, generosity, compassion, or whatever, to extend assistance to the new nations of Africa which are poor rather than to the nations of Western Europe which are rich. But is the mere wish to help enough? Can it possibly succeed? What form should such an effort take? On how massive a scale should it be conducted? Consider, for example, as a rough index of "absorptive" capacity, the daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population in various African countries. As table IV indicates, the highest per capita rate is found in the Union of South Africa—hardly the continent's most typical nation. Among the remaining countries, only Ghana shows a rate higher than 30 per thousand; only Algeria and Morocco a rate above 20 per thousand; and only Kenya, South-west Africa, and Tunisia, a rate above 10 per thousand. Most of the countries on the African Continent have a circulation rate of 5 per thousand or less—in contrast to Western Europe where the lowest rate (Spain) is 70 per thousand. (See table V.) Other indexes yield similar results.

These data, some observers would argue, indicate that the need (and hence the "absorptive" capacity) of underdeveloped nations is high rather than low; that an investment in human capital is likely to yield greater marginal returns there than in the advanced nations of Western Europe; and that such an investment is the best way of accelerating growth rates and improving standards of life in the underdeveloped parts of the world. In nations that have little, so the argument runs, the need for education is greater than in nations that have much; the need is greater and the rewards more handsome. Unfortunately, this argument, though superficially attractive, is empirically unsound.

First, it is true that education plays a crucial role in economic development, but the role differs in different stages of a nation's development. There is no easy correlation between educational levels and national income. An increase in a nation's literacy rate does not necessarily bring about an increase in its gross national product. As Mary Jean Bowman and C. Arnold Anderson found in their comparison between educational indexes and per capita incomes around the world:

Correlations of literacy rates with income were very loose, and nonlinear. Only countries with 90 percent literacy or better had 1955 per capita incomes of over \$500, and where literacy rates were under 30 percent, incomes were under \$200. However, countries with incomes under \$100 had literacy rates ranging up to 60 percent and those with incomes between \$100 and \$200 included countries with literacy as high as 70 to 80 percent. Moreover, in the 30 to 70 percent literacy range there was virtually no correlation between literacy and income.²²

Second, education is not a "free" good. It competes for a society's scarce resources with other forms of investment expenditures, and this makes it necessary to determine how much education shall be provided, what types of education shall be emphasized, to what degree, and how soon. Thus, it is by no means clear that sizable projects of mass education or extensive systems of higher education should be supported in newly developing nations. These countries do not yet have an effective demand for large numbers of educated workers; it will take considerable time to raise the presently limited absorptive capacity of their economies for educated persons; and, being poor countries, they cannot afford to pay for as much education as rich countries (considering the alternative uses of investment funds). Prof. W. Arthur Lewis, for example, a cogent (and friendly) observer of economic development in Africa, has expressed some skepticism about proposals for universal primary education:

The limited absorptive capacity of most west African economies today—especially owing to the backwardness of agriculture—makes frustration and dislocation inevitable if more than 50 percent of children enter school.²³

Prof. Hla Myint, a former rector of the University of Rangoon, has raised similar doubts with respect to overinvestment in higher education. Pointing to the dangers of an unemployed and underemployed intelligentsia composed of university graduates, he warns of "producing" too much of the wrong type of human capital:

Thus, among the southeast Asian countries, Malaya still has a genuinely unsatisfied demand for university graduates in the form of obvious gaps and unfilled vacancies. But when we turn to the other countries which have rapidly expanded their universities in the last decade, the situation is less clear cut. Here, everyone will agree that these countries still have a great "need" for trained people in the sense that their economic development can be accelerated if their administrative, managerial, technical, and professional people are more efficient and better trained, and if expanding demand can be created for them. But, after the first phase of filling up the vacancies left by the expatriates, many of these countries are in fact finding that, with their existing slow rates of economic growth, they can create employment only for a dwindling number of new university graduates and that there may even be a considerable amount of graduate

²² "The Role of Education in Development," *Development of Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1962, pp. 159-160.

²³ "Education and Economic Development," *International Social Science Journal*, vol. XIV, No. 4, 1962, p. 689, and pp. 685-699. For other useful discussion of manpower and education in the developmental process, see Gerald M. Meier, "Leading Issues in Developmental Economics," New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 266-284.

unemployment or underemployment. Thus, while all southeast Asian countries "need" trained people, only a few of them such as the Philippines (which has the greatest rate of economic growth in the region) and Malaya have a really effective and expanding demand for them at the moment. One of the major issues is how to translate the need for trained people into effective demand.²⁴

In short, the *need* for education is not synonymous with *absorptive capacity*.

This is not to suggest that the peoples of the less-developed countries are in any respect incapable of absorbing educational opportunities. Nor is there any implication that certain human beings—because of the region in which the accident of birth has placed them—lack personal endowment or inherent potential. My point is simply this: that investment in human capital is a matter of balanced growth, where success depends on the particular stage in which a particular nation happens to find itself at a particular time in its developmental process. Literacy programs can cause only frustration, bitterness, and discontent, unless the nation's economy can utilize people who have mastered this skill. The production of MIT engineers may create intrinsically valuable human assets, but prove redundant in an economy not yet sufficiently developed to employ them. In brief, the absorptive capacity of individuals may be unlimited; the absorptive capacity of nations is not. Education as a "consumer good" has unquestioned virtues; education as a "producer good" is a sound investment only under certain conditions.²⁵

On the basis of comparative advantage, therefore, the investment of resources in educational and cultural programs in underdeveloped areas (e.g., Africa and southeast Asia) should not be increased at the expense of Western Europe; instead, it should reflect the differential yield that may be expected in various regions. Certainly, for the time being, the promotion of such programs in underdeveloped countries should be undertaken step by step as the program base and the absorptive capacity of these countries are broadened. Above all, in judging the relative emphasis of U.S. commitments, let us remember Alfred Marshall's admonition to use caution and reserve, lest our advocacy of ideals outruns our grasp of the future.

²⁴ "The Universities of Southeast Asia and Economic Development," *Pacific Affairs*, summer 1962, pp. 118-119. See also Hla Myint, "Social Flexibility, Social Discipline and Economic Growth," quoted in Meler, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

²⁵ For a discussion of education-manpower policy in different growth stages, see Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, "Education, Manpower and Economic Growth: Strategies of Human Resource Development." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

TABLE IV.—Daily newspaper circulation: Africa

[Per 1,000 population]

Country	Year	Circulation	Country	Year	Circulation
Algeria.....	1961	22.0	Mozambique.....	1960	3.0
Angola.....	1961	¹ 9.0	Niger.....	1960	.4
Cameroon.....	1961	2.0	Nigeria.....	1961	⁴ 8.0
Central African Republic.....	1960	.4	Portuguese Guinea.....	1960	2.0
Chad.....	1961	.3	Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of.....	1959	7.0
Congo:			Senegal.....	1960	6.0
Brazzaville.....	1960	1.0	Sierra Leone.....	1961	8.0
Léopoldville.....	1959	2.0	Somalia.....	1959	1.0
Dahomey.....	1961	2.0	South Africa.....	1959	61.0
Ethiopia.....	1960	² 2.0	Southwest Africa.....	1960	14.0
Gambia.....	1959	5.0	Spanish equatorial region.....	1961	5.0
Ghana.....	1961	32.0	Sudan.....	1961	4.0
Guinea.....	1959	.2	Tanganyika.....	1961	4.0
Ivory Coast.....	1961	3.0	Togo.....	1961	4.0
Kenya.....	1961	14.0	Tunisia.....	1960	14.0
Liberia.....	1961	.8	Uganda.....	1960	8.0
Libya.....	1960	² 7.0	Zanzibar.....	1961	3.0
Madagascar.....	1961	9.0			
Morocco.....	1960	³ 22.0			

¹ Circulation figure refers to 3 dailies only.² Circulation figure refers to 6 dailies only.³ Circulation figure refers to 10 dailies only.⁴ Circulation figure refers to 20 dailies only.

Source: United Nations, "Statistical Yearbook 1962," pp. 649-650.

TABLE V.—Daily newspaper circulation: Western Europe

[Per 1,000 population]

Country	Year	Circulation	Country	Year	Circulation
Austria.....	1960	208	Italy.....	1961	101
Belgium.....	1961	285	Luxembourg.....	1960	445
Denmark.....	1961	345	Netherlands.....	1961	278
Finland.....	1960	358	Norway.....	1961	384
France.....	1960	252	Portugal.....	1961	81
Germany, Federal Republic of ¹	1960	² 307	Spain.....	1960	70
Greece.....	1959	125	Sweden.....	1961	477
Iceland.....	1961	450	Switzerland.....	1961	374
Ireland.....	1961	225	United Kingdom.....	1961	506

¹ Including West Berlin, but excluding the Saar.² Includes the circulation of regional editions.

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1962, pp. 649-650.

(7) *Despite some solid achievements, U.S. educational and cultural programs in Western Europe have not had as great an impact as is commonly assumed, and the effort now underway must be continued to achieve meaningful and lasting results.*

In one sense, Western Europe is in the process of pervasive Americanization. "Rightly or wrongly, progress in material things is the great passion of Europeans in these years," says an observer. "Europe's people are zealous converts to the cult of living. Having stirred to a new touch, Europe is amazed to find herself young and vigorous again. She sees herself mirrored in glass-walled skyscrapers and curved windshields, and she is determined that life is going to be better this time around. Europe is eager not to miss a single one of the world's pleasures and totally confident that every obstacle can be overcome."²⁶

²⁶ Charles A. Cerami, "The Pillars and the Arch," Atlantic Community Quarterly, fall 1963, p. 356.

Hollywood movies and transistor radios, refrigerators and television sets, supermarkets and Wimpy hamburger chains, vacation travel and Coca-Cola, narrow trousers and rock-and-roll, slaughter on the highways and juvenile delinquency—these are the indicia of what Europeans regard as “Americanization,” but what in reality are overt manifestations of an advanced, industrial, affluent society. The Volkswagen (or perhaps the Mercedes-Benz) is the mark of its affluence, and the twist the rhythm of its new culture.

This “low brow” mass culture has penetrated even the Iron Curtain. In Warsaw, adolescents congregate at the “Hybride”—a Young Communist League Club—“complete with American jukebox, Beatle records, a jazz band that has toured the United States, and a pool table.”²⁷ Nobody there does the twist any more, because “it’s out,” preferring instead the “Hully Gully,” “Shake,” and “T-Bird,” and hoping soon to learn the “Frug” and “Watusi.” To the younger generation, these are symbols of the “new,” “exciting,” and “Western,” and they have given the satellites a measure of contempt for the straitlaced, puritanical conservatism of the Soviet Union. As a distinguished Polish official in Moscow put it, “The Russians don’t know how to dress. They can’t mix a decent drink. They have no taste. They can’t even dance the twist. God, what a bore.”²⁸

However pervasive and influential this “low brow” culture may be among the masses—and we reiterate that it is a culture identified as “American”—the receptivity for things American among the intellectual elite of Europe is rather low. Indeed, there is a specific and particularized disdain for American civilization—its educational system and its cultural development:

America is a materialistic society—a mass culture devoid of cultivation.

* * *

American culture is Coca-Cola, blue jeans, chewing gum, pinball machines television, and the jukebox.

* * *

America is a baby culture. Except for Edgar Allan Poe, it had no literature before the 1920’s.

European intellectuals tend to regard Great Britain as the fountainhead of English language, literature, and civilization, while viewing America as a vulgar folk culture—an eddy in the Anglo-Saxon mainstream. French intellectuals tend to accept the Oxford-Cambridge dialect as “standard,” “right,” and “educated,” while associating American pronunciation with “vulgar,” “wrong,” and “unsophisticated.” Their attitude to the American language reflects, in a sense, their attitude to American culture.

In France, this anti-Americanism seems to be pandemic among intellectuals, even among those who “like” the United States. It is articulated in perhaps its most extreme form by Cyrille Arnavon, professor of comparative literature, author of the excellent “Histoire littéraire des Etats-Unis,” and now cultural attaché at the French Embassy in London. In his book “L’Americanisme et nous” (Paris, 1958), Arnavon does not mince words or disguise his bitterness: The United States is an imperialist power bent on colonizing the world—not the “primitive” or “archaic” cultures, but the ancient cultures of

²⁷ Cynthia Grenier, “A Tough Time for Puritans Behind the Iron Curtain,” *New York Times* magazine, May 24, 1964, p. 14.

²⁸ *Id.*, p. 105.

the Occident. "Intent on dominating our markets, the invader captures our minds, transforms our customs and institutions, and destroys the equilibrium of the civilized world." In an effort to impose her moral order on France, and export her national ideology, America employs hordes of teachers and lecturers—"philosopher-theologians who violate our secular tradition," "historians who exalt American Manifest Destiny," "Afro-Americans who are supposed to demonstrate the contentment of their racial brothers in the United States," "political theorists who offer a flattering version of the American electoral system," "union officials who extol American productivity," "men who favor an estheticism without roots, a prophetic or non-teleological interpretation of history, and a more or less strongly politicized manichaeism." Young Frenchmen are recruited for scholarships in the United States before they have received their theoretical training and developed their critical faculties, so that they can be more effectively exposed to ideological indoctrination. Fulbright lecturers and students are sent to French universities so they can spy for the State Department. The Socratic method is used in the classroom so that—through insidious interrogation—the instructor can put the heretic against the wall and compel a pervasive conformism. Detailed dossiers are kept on French union officials, university students and professors, journalists, writers, and intellectuals, so that, in case of an international crisis, their attitudes can accurately be anticipated. In short, the United States (as pictured by Arnavon) is an octopus whose tentacles are ubiquitous and whose purpose is the total subjugation of France and her people.

"L'Americanisme et nous" never became a best seller, but as an expression of attitudes of French intellectuals it was by no means atypical. Similar sentiments were stated only recently by an esteemed scholar, Maurice Duverger, professor of law and economics at the University of Paris, director of social research at the prestigious Sciences Po, and formerly front page editorial writer for *Le Monde*. In an interview for the weekly *L'Express*, Duverger passionately declared:

It must be said, it must be written! There is only one immediate danger for Europe, and that is the American civilization. There will be no Stalinism or communism in France. They are scarecrows that frighten only sparrows now. Today, all that belongs to the past. On the other hand, the pressure of American society, the domination of the American economy—all that is very dangerous. * * * Nothing is stupider than stylish anti-Americanism. But at the base of it all there is, just the same, a real question. America is a different society from ours. It was built by pioneers who for their cultural baggage had the Bible and a sense of adventure. With these two elements, they succeeded in making a body of men for whom money is the essential criterion—the basis of their system of values. In a country like France, the employee who reads your gas meter possesses a scale of aristocratic values. He can distinguish perfectly among a *nouveau riche*, an intelligent man, and a poet. Whether he knows it or not, the cultural ensemble that is at the bottom of his attitudes is shaped by an accumulation of history different from that of the Americans. I think that this element will help us to resist the American pressure. But don't forget one thing: America is evolving. As Russia is liberalizing itself, so is the United States civilizing itself. * * * But it will probably take as long for America in its entirety to reject a system of values based on money and gadgets as it will take Russia to reject a political system based on dictatorship. For us, the essential is to escape both of them. Our luck, as Europeans, is that we are behind the times—in planned consumption in relation to the United States and in planned socialization in relation to the U.S.S.R. For us, the problem is to arrive at the abundant society when the transitory American phase is over and at socialization when the transitory phase of the proletarian

dictatorship is finished. The second seems sure. The first is not sure at all. Quite the contrary. That is why America is for us the most dangerous.²⁹

Such statements, to be sure, do not call forth patriotic legions rushing to man the cultural barricades. They do indicate, however, an undercurrent of concern among many European intellectuals—the French in particular—about creeping Americanization. They reflect a cultural anti-Americanism which is not at all unfashionable in European academic circles, and which has persisted in spite of the massive U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs over the last decade and a half.

This does not mean, of course, that our programs in the past have been a failure. On the contrary, they must be credited with some solid achievements—especially in view of the massive obstacles encountered. Nevertheless, it is now apparent that these programs suffered from a short-run, single-shot orientation, designed to create a vague kind of good will for the United States rather than to produce a more lasting “institutional” impact. Especially during the decade following World War II, we placed too much emphasis on “information” programs beamed at a mass audience, rather than custom-tailored, individualized programs geared to the intellectual elites of the sophisticated West European societies. As a result, the institutional impact on European education systems has been less than spectacular. In France, for example, “while the interest in American studies has increased among French university students, qualified professors are seriously lacking. Of the 70 university professors of English, less than a dozen can be termed American specialists; and, of these latter, a few seem positively possessed by the pathology of American society.” On the high school level, the situation is equally discouraging: “of the more than 4,000 secondary school teachers of English, only about 400 have been to the United States, less than those who go to England in 1 year.”³⁰ In the other humanities, and in the social sciences, the statistics “tell the same or less happy story.” With the exception of Great Britain—where the universities have increased the professorial chairs devoted to “American studies” from 7 in 1958 to 33 in 1962 and to 43 in 1963—some of the Scandinavian countries, and possibly Italy, the educational exchange programs have seemingly not produced a permanent imprint on the study of American thought, literature, and institutions in the European educational system.³¹

²⁹ See “Letter from Paris,” the *New Yorker*, Mar. 21, 1964, pp. 157-158. See also the recent book by René Etiemble, professor of comparative literature at the University of Paris, “Parlez-vous Français?” For a contrary view among Europeans—one that looks upon “modernization,” “standardization,” and “materialistic” improvements (i.e., “Americanization”) in European society as desirable—consider the following statement by Prof. Jean Rivoire: “L’uniformisation doit aller plus avant dans le concret; et il nous faut dénoncer ici la tentation de ce que j’appellerais l’Europe folklorique; il est des formes de particularisme—les plus voyantes peut-être—qui ne sont en définitive que le résultat de l’inégalité des niveaux de vie; le pittoresque sicilien peut charmer le touriste plus que le confort banal de l’Europe nordique; si l’élévation des niveaux de vie tend à remplacer les baillons du *lazzarone* par le complet veston standard, tant pis pour le pittoresque! Aligner les sous-alimentés sur les peuples riches en calories, les flots insalubres sur les cités modernes, les villages où l’isolement perpétue les formes de vie médiévale, sur les villages intégrés au présent, c’est uniformiser l’Europe; mais cette uniformisation-là, qui fait reculer la misère et l’analphabétisme, qui est la personne, qui donc oserait la déplorer? La diversité des génies européens serait une bien pauvre chose si elle ne pouvait servir au relèvement des niveaux de vie et si elle résidait seulement dans les coiffes des cornemuses, les mantilles.” Quoted by François Bondy, “Cultural Diversity—Political Unity: A European Dilemma?” 9th Annual Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Chicago, Oct. 23-26, 1963.

³⁰ Comments of an American Fulbright professor in France, July 1962.

³¹ For a comprehensive study, see Walter Johnson, “American Studies Abroad: Progress and Difficulties in Selected Countries,” a special report from the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Washington, July 1963.

Two conclusions are, therefore, warranted. First, despite some solid achievements, our educational and cultural "mission" in Western Europe has by no means been accomplished. Much remains to be done. Second, if the image of the United States currently prevalent in Europe is to be changed to conform to some daguerrotype of reality, the character of our cultural diplomacy will have to be radically changed. We must communicate more effectively with the intellectual elite, in general, and the academic community, in particular. We must approach both on the highest level of sophistication and academic integrity. In our desire to "explain" America, let us not try to correct misconceptions with the press release, the "inspired" story, the puerile documentary, the schoolboy's travelog. Let us offer the intellectual an exposure in depth—a perspective and background that transcends the hurried contact of a tourist's venture. Let us emphasize programs which are likely to stimulate study of American language and civilization on all levels of the educational hierarchy under professors who have formed their impressions on the basis of serious scholarship rather than stylish preconceptions.

There is some evidence that USIS is already groping in this direction,³² but the unfinished task is great and the obstacles prodigious. Moreover, there may be objections, perhaps in Congress, that the United States should not engage in cultural programs involving minorities and elites of a society. Realism, however, compels us to recognize that it is precisely these minorities and elites which exercise an influence beyond their numerical strength. It is they who are the opinionmakers and taste-setters—the governing group in all areas of the society. Hence, it is they who can produce what the jargon merchants call the "multiplier" effect.

To restate my general argument in its baldest form: If it is a primary function of educational and cultural diplomacy to support the foreign policy of the United States, (1) enlightened self-interest dictates an increase in the *total* expenditures on educational and cultural activities,³³ and (2) realism militates against a *relative* "downgrading" of Western Europe for the sake of expanding such activities elsewhere in the world, especially in the underdeveloped nations.

³² "U.S. Overhauling Information Plan for West Europe," *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 1.

³³ See this Commission's report, "A Beacon of Hope," Washington, April 1963.

