Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Introduction

This Report is submitted consistent with Condition (10)(C) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).  The Convention was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997.  This report covers the period January 1 through December 31, 2023.

Condition (10)(C) provides that the President shall submit on January 1 annually to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete classified and unclassified report setting forth—

1. a certification of those countries included in the Intelligence Community’s (IC) Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the Director of Central Intelligence’s Arms Control Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)) that are determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
2. for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to adherence of the country to its obligations under the Convention;
3. the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party:
   1. to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of non-compliance;
   2. to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and
   3. to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
4. a determination of the military significance and broader security risks arising from any compliance issue identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
5. a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the United States described in clause (iii).

It is the view of the United States that, in most cases, efforts to resolve compliance concerns discovered through review of declarations or inspection results should first be attempted through diplomatic means.  This does not preclude or prevent the escalatory step of requesting challenge inspections, but diplomatic outreach is an initial mechanism to attempt to resolve compliance concerns before the need to resort to challenge inspection requests.

For its part, both as a matter of national policy and as a guide to national policy, the United States undertakes its own independent review – based upon the best available information, including intelligence information – of the compliance of CWC States Parties with their obligations under the Convention.  The United States believes that CWC States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places a high premium upon their compliance with specific declaration and implementation provisions (e.g. Articles III, IV, V, VI, and VII) and the “general obligations” provision under Article I.

Information and assessments in this report are current as of December 31, 2023.  This report highlights developments since the conclusion of the reporting period included in the Condition (10)(C) Report published in 2023, and, to the extent possible, refrains from repeating older information found in previously submitted reports. 

The United States continues to take extraordinary steps, bilaterally and in close coordination with Close Allies and like-minded states, to address CWC non-compliance and restore deterrence of chemical weapons (CW) development and use.

• The United States continues to be a member of the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (“the Partnership”), a French-led initiative created in 2018 in which participating states made a political commitment to increase pressure on those responsible for the use of CW.  As of December 2023, the Partnership had 40 members, plus the European Union.
• Further, the United States engaged in bilateral efforts throughout 2023 to encourage Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) member States to pay their arrears, so that their voting rights could be reinstated.  The United States, along with allies, lobbied countries that usually do not attend the annual Conference of the States Parties (CSP) meeting and encouraged them to do so.

The United States also works diligently with partners and the OPCW to support and encourage effective national implementation by other States Parties of their obligations under the Convention.

The OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) reported, as of July 31, 2023, the following regarding Article VII implementation:

• Somalia, which became a State Party in 2013, does not have a designated National Authority.
• Sixty eight¹ States Parties had not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures (scheduled chemical transfers, prohibitions, penalties, extraterritorial obligations, legal basis of regulations, establishment of national authority, and other initial measures).  They were:  Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cabo Verde, Chad, Congo, Cook Islands, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
• One State Party, Tonga, has not yet submitted its required initial declaration (due July 28, 2003) pursuant to the Convention.  The TS is unable to fulfill its verification tasks with regard to this State Party.  The United States made efforts in 2023 to encourage Tonga to prepare and submit its initial declaration.

As of December 31, 2023, there were 192 CWC States Parties.²  Four States have neither ratified nor acceded to the CWC and, therefore, are not States Parties to the Convention (one signatory State, Israel, and three non-signatory States, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan).

During the reporting period, South Sudan, working with the OPCW TS has undertaken efforts to prepare to accede to the CWC.  The Department of State met with South Sudanese representatives on the margins of the CWC Fifth Review Conference and the 28th session of the CSP to acknowledge progress made and to urge South Sudan to complete its process to accede to the CWC.  The Director-General (DG) of the OPCW met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of South Sudan, on the margins of CHEMEX held in Algeria between September 28 and October 4, 2023.  They discussed the importance of upholding the global norm against the use of chemical weapons and signed a joint communiqué on their work together to complete the accession process.

Four States Parties – Burma, Iran, Russia, and Syria – are certified in non-compliance with the CWC.  Russia and Syria were first certified in non-compliance in April 2018.  Iran was first certified in non-compliance in November 2018.  Burma was first certified in non-compliance in 2019.  Additional information is available in the 2024 classified Condition (10)(C) Reports.  The United States also cannot certify the People’s Republic of China’s compliance, which was first reported in 2021.

COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

BURMA

FINDING

The United States certifies that Burma is in non-compliance with the CWC due to its failure to declare its past CW program and destroy its historical CW production facility (CWPF) near Tonbo.  The United States has concerns that a CW stockpile may remain at Burma’s historical CWPF.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

For the reasons described in previous reports, the United States continues to assess that Burma is in violation of its obligations under CWC Article I, paragraph 4, and Article III, paragraph 1 of the CWC; and continues to have concerns about Burma’s compliance with Article I, paragraphs 1(a) and 2. 

BACKGROUND

There is no additional information to report in 2023.  See previous years reports for additional details.  Most of the original buildings associated with Burma’s legacy research, production, weaponization, and storage of sulfur mustard munitions during the 1980s remain at the historical CWPF.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

Burma did not attend the annual CSP sessions in 2021, 2022, and 2023.  The United States has not engaged with Burma bilaterally on these issues following the February 2021 military coup, but continues to monitor the situation in Burma closely.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

FINDING

Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Convention due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

In accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(a), each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.”  The United States is concerned about the PRC’s interest in PBAs and toxins because these agents have utility for CW applications.

BACKGROUND

The PRC signed the CWC on January 13, 1993, ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997, and submitted its initial declarations in 1998.  Since then, scientists at a PRC military research institute have expressed interest in military applications of PBAs, such as fentanyl.³  Other PRC research organizations have been conducting and directing military research, discovery, testing and characterization of animal venoms and marine toxins  – which raises further questions about the intended purposes of the work conducted by the military researchers.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

During the November 2023 CSP, in bilateral discussions with the PRC, the United States reiterated its concerns about the PRC’s potential development of aerosolized fentanyl.  In response to U.S. concerns, the PRC reiterated that it does not use fentanyl for law enforcement purposes.  The PRC objected to the 2021 CSP decision on the aerosolized use of central nervous system (CNS)-acting chemicals and issued a joint statement with Iran, Russia, and Syria that, “Article II, paragraphs 1(a) and 9(d) of the Convention permits the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes’ as long as types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.  Therefore, the Convention allows States Parties to choose their own method of law enforcement in full conformity with the provisions of the Convention including the General Purpose Criterion (GPC).”

In November 2023, the United States and the PRC met in Washington for bilateral discussions on arms control, during which meeting the U.S. side raised concerns about PRC CWC compliance and emphasized the importance of preserving the international prohibition on chemical weapons.  The United States continues to engage the PRC about the implementation of its CWC obligations.  The United States will continue to monitor and report, as well as pursue substantive bilateral engagement with the PRC.  The United States will also continue to engage our partners on this issue, both to raise awareness of the threat and build diplomatic pressure on the PRC to address these concerns.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)

FINDING

The United States certifies that Iran is in non-compliance with the CWC due to (1) its failure to declare its transfer of CW to Libya during the 1978-1987 Libya-Chad war, (2) its failure to declare its complete holdings of Riot Control Agents (RCAs), (3) its failure to submit a complete CWPF declaration, and (4) its pursuit of PBAs for offensive purposes. 

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

In accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone” or to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”  Iran maintains a chemical weapons program that includes pursuit of certain PBAs as part of a broader category of “incapacitating agents” for offensive purposes.  The development and proliferation of such agents is in violation of Iran’s obligations under Article I.

See previous reports for analysis of Iran’s violation of its obligations under Article III, paragraph 1(a) (iv); Article III, paragraph 1(c)(i) and (ii); and Article III, paragraph 1(e).

BACKGROUND

Development of PBA Weapons

Since 2005, some of Iran’s military-controlled facilities, Imam Hossein University (IHU) and Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT), have researched chemicals that have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects.  Most recently on September 23, 2023, an X (formerly Twitter) account representing Lab Dookhtegan – whose members claim to be hacker organization in opposition to Iranian state-sponsored cyber actors — posted confidential documents detailing an Iranian military university’s development of grenades meant to disseminate medetomidine, an anesthetic that is a central nervous system-acting chemical.  According to the documents, this development included information on the production and testing of prototype weapons.

For further background on Iran’s history of non-compliance and background on Iranian PBA and toxin development, including undeclared chemical weapons transfers, incomplete RCA declarations, and incomplete declaration of chemical weapons production facilities, see the 2023 10(C) Report.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS and Next Steps

On November 22, 2018, the United States addressed Iran’s non-compliance with the CWC in its national statement to the CWC’s Fourth Review Conference.  In 2019, the G7 also issued a statement of concern about Iranian CWC compliance further reinforcing the U.S. non-compliance finding.  In 2020, the United States designated Iranian defense entity Shahid Meisami Group (SMG) and its director, Mehran Babri, for sanctions under Executive Order 13382 because of its responsibility for projects involving the testing and production of chemical agents for use as so-called incapacitation agents. 

In part to address concerns about Iran’s work on PBAs, the United States led an effort in 2021 at the OPCW CSP that concluded with the adoption of a decision affirming that “the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals is understood to be inconsistent with law enforcement purposes as a ‘purpose not prohibited’ under the Convention.”  Iran—along with Russia, the PRC, and Syria—was a principal opponent of the decision.

No bilateral discussions with Iran occurred during the 2023 reporting year regarding the CWC.  The last CWC compliance-related bilateral exchanges occurred in 2001 and 2004, on the margins of OPCW EC meetings, but discussions did not resolve any of the issues raised by the United States.

Additionally, in November 2023 at the twenty-eighth session of the OPCW’s CSP, the OPCW adopted a U.S. co-sponsored decision on “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use”.  This decision creates a mandate for the OPCW Director-General to report to States Parties annually on information available on transfers of scheduled chemicals.  This reporting could help facilitate transparency on any declared transfers of scheduled chemicals from Iran to Syria.

The United States will continue to monitor and report on Iran’s non-compliance with the CWC and continue to raise awareness of the issue with partners.  Additional U.S. action at the OPCW to put additional pressure on Iran will focus on addressing potential threats posed by central nervous system-acting chemicals and toxins.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

FINDING

The United States certifies that Russia is in non-compliance with the CWC.  Russia has used chemical weapons at least twice in recent years in assassination attempts using Novichok nerve agents – also known as fourth generation agents (FGAs)—in 2018 and 2020.  Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons program.  During the reporting period, Russia also used RCAs as a method of warfare in Ukraine, in violation of its CWC obligations.  Russia is also in non-compliance for the lack of its complete declarations of its: (1) CWPFs; (2) CW development facilities; and (3) CW stockpiles.  Russian scientific institutes have researched and developed chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies to deliver CW agents.  Russia has conducted chemical weapons-related testing at the Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground.  The United States continues to have serious concerns regarding Russia’s assistance to Syria regarding the regime’s use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Douma in April 2018.  Furthermore, the United States has concerns that Russia’s PBA program is for offensive purposes.  In addition to its use of RCAs, the United States also has concerns about reports that Russia has used other chemical agents against Ukrainian armed forces.

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

In accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons” or “to use chemical weapons.”  On August 20, 2020, the Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) officers used a Novichok nerve agent to poison a Russian opposition leader, Aleksey Navalny, while he was traveling back to Moscow after campaigning in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia, against pro-Kremlin candidates in regional elections. On March 4, 2018, Russia attempted to assassinate two individuals in the UK using a Novichok nerve agent.  These acts are clear violations of the CWC Article I, paragraph 1 prohibition on the use of CW. 

In accordance with Article 1, paragraph 5, each State Party “undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”  The United States assesses that Russian forces have used RCAs against Ukrainian armed forces in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine.  Although not all uses of riot control agents by armed forces amount to use “as a method of warfare,” use by military forces against combatants on the battlefield in an armed conflict violates Article I, paragraph 5 of the CWC.   

In accordance with Article I, paragraph 2, each State Party “undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses.” Each State Party is also required to declare its chemical weapons program in accordance with Article III.  Russia completed destruction of its declared Category 1 CW stockpile on September 27, 2017.  Based on existing information, however, the United States does not believe Russia has declared all of its CW stockpile, CWPFs, and all CW development facilities.  Rather, the United States assesses that Russia maintains an undeclared CW program. 

In addition to these violations, the United States is concerned about reports of use of other chemical agents by Russia in Ukraine.  At the 28th session of the OPCW CSP, the Ukrainian representative asserted that Russian troops had begun adding the CWC Schedule 3 chemical Chloropicrin to grenades already containing RCAs.

The United States is also concerned that Russia has a PBA program intended for purposes inconsistent with the CWC.  Russian Health Minister Shevchenko acknowledged to the press that Russian special operations forces employed “derivatives of fentanyl” to resolve the October 2002 Dubrovka theater hostage crisis.  The United States is concerned that Russia is pursuing these types of agents for offensive purposes, which would be a violation of Article I.  Russia long opposed the efforts to adopt a decision on the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals, which was adopted at the OPCW in 2021.  According to a non-paper Russia published at the OPCW in November 2018 entitled, Aerosolisation of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes, Russia believes use of these agents “is not regulated under the [Chemical Weapons] Convention.” 

In accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(d), each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.  In January 2023, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) reported Russia’s military presence and cooperation with Syrian forces in Douma at the time of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma on April 7, 2018, including exclusive control of the airspace over Douma by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Areospace Defence Forces.  Russia’s joint air operations and negotiations to retake eastern Ghouta from opposition forces, and its activities assisting the Syrian regime to cover up the use of CW after the attack, raise serious questions about Russia’s possible role assisting the Syrian regime’s use of CW on April 7, 2018.  Further, Russia maintained a joint operations room with Syria and Iran in charge of war strategy and coordination in Syria at a time when the Syrian forces repeatedly used chemical weapons.  Russia continues to conduct a global disinformation campaign in defense of the Syrian regime.

BACKGROUND

The Convention entered into force for Russia on December 5, 1997, and Russia made its initial declaration in March 1998.  Russia’s declaration included CWPFs, CW storage facilities (CWSFs), a CW development facility, and a stockpile of almost 40,000 MT of CW agent, in both bulk and weaponized form.  As of September 27, 2017, Russia had completed destruction of its declared Category 1 CW stockpile.  Its Article VI declaration included Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and other chemical production facility plant sites. 

Use of CW

Russia has denied any responsibility for the use of a Novichok chemical agent in an assassination attempt against UK citizen Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal, despite the evidence that Russia is responsible, including UK identification and video of officers from Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate.  The Soviet Union developed these toxic Novichok agents in the 1970s and 1980s as part of its development of a new class of “fourth-generation” nerve agents.  It is highly likely these agents were developed to prevent detection by the West and circumvent international CW controls.  The OPCW TS confirmed, as part of two separate Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs) to the UK in 2018, that the chemical agent used to poison the Skripals matched the UK’s analysis and was, at that time, unscheduled.   

With respect to the poisoning of Aleksey Navalny in August 2020, analysis from several national laboratories, including laboratories in Germany, France, Sweden, and other OPCW-designated laboratories, concluded that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from a group of chemical agents, Novichoks.  In addition, the FSB was tracking and surveilling Navalny during his stay in Tomsk, Russia.  Navalny has for many years been the target of FSB surveillance, including wiretapping and covert video surveillance.  Russia continues to deny any responsibility for the attack.  On February 16, 2024, Aleksey Navalny died while imprisoned in Russia. 

The OPCW TS also confirmed, as part of a TAV to Germany in September 2020, the analytical findings of German, French, and Swedish laboratories that determined Navalny was exposed to an unscheduled nerve agent from the Novichok group.  Specifically, the unclassified TAV summary stated that the unscheduled nerve agent had “structural characteristics similar to the toxic chemicals belonging to Schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15, which were added to the Annex on Chemicals at the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019.”

Use of RCAs as a Method of Warfare

The United States assesses that Russia has repeatedly used RCAs as a method of warfare across the frontlines in Ukraine. 

In May 2023, Russia’s state-controlled Channel 1 broadcasted an interview with a Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces.  In the video, drone footage shows a grenade being dropped into a trench, smoke billowing from the trench, and then soldiers fleeing from the trench.  On the broadcast, the soldier states, “We are trying to force them out with smoke.”  The broadcast then goes on to state, “Soldiers from the 88^th Brigade are using the so-called ‘Bird-Cherry’ tear grenades.”  In December 2023, Russia’s 810^th Naval Infantry Brigade stated on its Telegram channel that the brigade is using a “radical change in tactics” by dropping K-51⁴ grenades on Ukrainian forces.

In addition to these Russian reports, there have been several Ukrainian reports on use of RCAs by Russia’s forces.  On September 23, 2022, Ukraine’s Operational Command South alleged a Russian drone strike dropping grenade devices that released a noxious smoke in a Facebook post.  Operation Command South identified a Soviet-era K-51 tear gas grenade designed to disseminate the powdered, highly irritating riot control agent CS (2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile).  Ukraine’s General Staff of the Armed Forces (AFU) posted photos of a spent K-51 tear gas grenade and a downed quadcopter on Facebook on October 12, 2023.  The AFU Facebook allegation stated that Russian forces had dropped K-51 grenades from drones on Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhzhia region.  At the 28th session of the OPCW CSP, the Ukrainian representative expressed serious concerns about “the Russian Federation uses [of] riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine”.  On December 4, 2022, the Naval Forces of AFU charged on their Facebook page that Russia dropped K-51 grenades on Ukrainian “defenders in the East” who were able to hold their positions through their chemical defenses.

Incomplete Declarations

The United States believes the Russian CW declaration is not complete, in particular with respect to its chemical agent and weapons stockpile, as demonstrated by the 2018 and 2020 Novichok poisonings.  The United States also notes that Russia may have additional facilities that require declaration as CWPFs.  Lastly, the United States does not share Russia’s narrow interpretation of the CWC that Article III only requires declaration of facilities that are used “primarily for” the development of CW.  Instead, the United States believes that all CW development facilities, including CW testing facilities, need to be declared.

CW Development Facilities

In violation of Article I, the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute, 27th Scientific Center, and the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) have engaged in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies for delivering such weapons.  GosNIIOKhT is a Russian institute with a longstanding role in researching and developing chemical weapons, and GosNIIOKhT developed Russia’s Novichok chemical weapons.  Since 2016, GosNIIOKhT has expanded its research, development, testing, and evaluation capabilities.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute and the 27th Scientific Center are organizations subordinate to the Russian Federation Armed Forces Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense troops.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute stewards Russia’s Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground, where Russia conducts chemical weapons-related testing.  The 27th Scientific Center has been involved with Russian chemical weapons research and testing activities.

Assistance to the Syrian Regime

Russia’s assistance to the Syrian regime may have facilitated and enabled the regime’s use of chemical weapons.  Beginning in September 2015 until present, the Russian Government has been directly involved in the Syrian civil war, assisting the Syrian regime to execute its military offensive by providing Russia’s airpower and other material support to the regime. 

For example, in its report dated January 27, 2023, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe that around 7:30 p.m. local time on April 7, 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more.  The report also points out that the IIT received credible information corroborated through multiple sources that Russian forces were co-located at Dumayr airbase alongside the Tiger Forces.  It also concludes that, based on the extensive review of military analysis and of Russia’s and Syria’s public statements and open sources that, prior to the eastern Ghouta offensive – and since the early stages of the intervention of the Russian Federation in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic – the relationship between the Tiger Forces and the Russian Forces was one of special proximity and close coordination at the operational and tactical level.  The IIT also obtained information that, at the time of the attack, the airspace over Douma was exclusively controlled by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces.  For additional details, see the 2023 Condition (10)(C) Report.

Moreover, Russia has continued supporting Syria by seeking to obstruct discussion of Syrian CW use in international fora in 2023, including at the UN and at the OPCW.

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The United States has had longstanding concerns about Russian compliance with the CWC, and has engaged in numerous exchanges with Russia regarding a number of compliance issues.  The United States has also taken significant action to address its concerns with Russian non-compliance.  For historical details see the 2023 Condition (10)(C) Report.

The United States has imposed a range of sanctions on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) and other authorities in response to Moscow’s chemical and biological weapons activities.  The sanctions imposed under the CBW Act will remain in place until Russia (1) is no longer using chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in violation of international law, (2) has provided reliable assurances it will not engage in any such activities in the future, and (3) is willing to allow on-site inspection to ensure it is not using CBW in violation of international law.  To date, Russia has not met those conditions.    

Furthermore, in August 2023 the United States designated four FSB operatives pursuant to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 for their involvement in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny in August 2020.  The United States also imposed visa restrictions on these operatives for their involvement in a gross violation of human rights pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023.

The United States has played a leading role in countering Russian disinformation at the OPCW and highlighting that Russia has a history of chemical weapons use.  For additional details see previous reports.

On October 10, 2023, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States submitted questions to Russia in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article IX of the CWC to ask Russia if its armed forces used RCAs in combat operations in the conflict in Ukraine, and to ask it to explain the above-described Channel 1 broadcast showing an interview with a Russian soldier describing use of tear gas against Ukrainian forces.  To date, Russia has claimed that its forces’ statements were a “misunderstanding.”

In November 2023 – during the 28th session of the OPCW CSP – the United States and thirty-one other countries made statements condemning Russia for its use of chemicals weapons and its brutal war in Ukraine.

On November 27, 2023, during the 28th session of the CSP, the United States co-hosted a side event with a panel of experts to discuss the prohibition on use of RCAs as a method of warfare under Article I of the CWC.  During the event, the United States showed the Channel 1 broadcast of the Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces.

On November 29, 2023, during the 28th session of the CSP, States Parties voted by secret ballot to fill the three available Executive Council seats of the Eastern European Group.  The Conference elected Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine with the Russian Federation losing a vote for a seat on the Executive Council for the first time since it became a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.  This rejection demonstrated States Parties’ resolve to hold Russia to account for its actions – including its war of aggression and continued violations of the Convention.

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (SYRIA)

FINDING

The United States certifies that Syria is in non-compliance with the CWC.  The United States assesses that the Syrian regime used CW more than fifty times against the Syrian people since acceding to the Convention in 2013, in violation of its obligations under Article I of the CWC.  In addition, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime did not declare all elements of its CW program, as required by Article III of the CWC, and in fact retains CW as defined by the CWC.  Further, Syria has failed to cooperate with the OPCW’s work to verify the accuracy and completeness of the Syrian declaration.  Rather, Syria’s actions continue to impede resolution of these matters. 

ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

In accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(b), each State Party is obligated never under any circumstances to use CW.  The United States assesses that the Syrian regime repeatedly used chlorine and sarin as chemical weapons after its accession to the CWC, from 2014 through 2019, in violation of Article I of the CWC.  In spite of compelling evidence, which included findings of attribution by two independent international mechanisms, Syria continues to deny it used CW.

In accordance with CWC Article III, paragraph 1, each State Party is obligated to declare its CW program.  The Syrian declaration contains obvious gaps, discrepancies, and omissions, in violation of Article III of the CWC and the additional declaration requirements outlined in operative paragraph 6 of UNSCR 2118.  In light of the persistent and significant gaps, discrepancies, and omissions in the declaration, and Syria’s repeated use of CW, as independently confirmed by both the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the OPCW IIT, and the additional instances that the United States assesses can be attributed to the Syrian regime, the United States assesses that Syria retains a CW capability and has not disclosed the full history and scope of its CW-related activities.

BACKGROUND

Detailed background information on Syria’s CW use and OPCW and U.S. responses to the Syria’s noncompliance in previous years may be found in the 2014 – 2023 reports.  Following the threat of military force in response to the use of sarin in multiple, small-scale attacks in opposition areas, and in a large-scale attack using surface-to-surface rockets in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in August 2013, Syria deposited its instruments of accession to the CWC on September 14, 2013.  The United States and Russia then negotiated the Framework for Elimination of the Syrian CW Program.  This Framework led to the September 27, 2013, OPCW EC decision and to UNSCR 2118, which, taken together, established milestones for the full disclosure and elimination of Syria’s CW program and stringent verification, including unfettered access for the OPCW to Syrian sites and individuals. 

After a preliminary disclosure of its CW program, Syria submitted to the OPCW its treaty-mandated initial declaration in October 2013, followed by numerous subsequent amendments.  The sum of Syria’s disclosures, declarations, and amendments provided an incomplete declaration of Syria’s CW program.  In April 2014, the OPCW Director-General established the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to attempt to clarify these concerns.  To date Syria has not provided adequate information to resolve all declaration issues, with most of the issues raised by the DAT still outstanding.

During 2023, Syria continued to fail to fully cooperate with the DAT and instead obstructed its work, including by preventing the deployment of the entire team in country for most of the year by denying visas to its lead technical expert.  During the period in which the full DAT team was unable to visit Syria in 2023, the DAT completed two deployments of a reduced team to Damascus, in January (17-22) and April (12-19), for limited in-country activities.  A separate meeting between the OPCW TS and Syria was held at a higher level in Beirut, on 22-23 June 2023. 

On October 10, 2023, the OPCW Director General (DG) announced to the 104^th session of the Executive Council that Syria agreed to hold the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus, after two and a half years’ delay.  Syria announced, via Note Verbale dated 9 October 2023, that it would allow the entire DAT team back into the country to meet with the Syrian National authority, during dates suggested by the Secretariat (30 October – 5 November 2023).  The December 2023 inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) did not result in new information that resolved any outstanding issues.  The DAT will continue its work in 2024.    

In an unclassified report dated November 24, 2023, the Director-General noted that analysis of samples collected by the DAT in April 2023 revealed the presence of indicators of several chemical warfare agents that were not declared.  The Secretariat requested Syria to provide plausible and verifiable explanations.

During this reporting period, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which investigates whether toxic chemicals have been used as a weapon in Syria, had no deployments to Syria.  The FFM continues to look into several incidents from 2016-2019.  The FFM is currently extracting data from interviews and analyzing all information obtained. 

On January 27, 2023, the OPCW IIT, which is responsible for identifying the perpetrators of specific instances of chemical weapons use in Syria, released its third report. The IIT found reasonable grounds to believe that between 7:10 and 7:40 p.m. local time on April 7, 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Sryian special forces known as the Tiger Forces, dropped two chlorine cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more. This is the ninth case of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime independently attributed by the IIT and OPCW-UN JIM.

Ahead of the 104^th session of the EC, on 27 September 2023, the TS issued a report marking ten years since Syria joined the CWC.  The report, titled “Accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention: Ten Years On,” recounts developments since Syria joined the CWC, including uses of chemical weapons and efforts related to Syria’s initial declaration.  Among other things, the report identifies three areas of unresolved outstanding issues of concern with respect to Syria’s initial declaration, namely: unverified quantities of chemical weapons, undeclared production of chemical weapons, and undeclared chemical weapons and facilities.  According to the report, these “issues give rise to concerns regarding the potential existence of undeclared stockpiles of chemical weapons, activities, and/or facilities.”

EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS

The United States continues to seize every available opportunity to bring attention to Syria’s non-compliance with the CWC and continues to take action to deter the regime from continuing to maintain its chemical weapons capability.  For past efforts, see the previous reports. 

At the OPCW, the United States uses its statements before the EC and the CSP to underscore that Syria:  1) admit its past use of CW; 2) cooperate with the FFM, DAT, and IIT; 3) adopt a proactive and fully transparent approach, as recommended by the DG; and (4) resolve the gaps, discrepancies, and omissions in its declaration.  During 2023, the United States denounced Russia’s actions to hinder efforts to address Syria’s violations at the OPCW EC and CSP, issued replies to Syria at the OPCW EC; issued a statement at the CWC Review Conference; and continued to express its support for the IIT and the DAT and their mission.  The National Security Council and Secretary of State also issued statements marking the 10^th anniversary of the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta that killed over 1,400 individuals. 

In 2023, the United States led an effort with other States Parties to further accountability and deter Syria from maintaining its chemical weapons by co-sponsoring a decision adopted at the 28^th CSP titled: “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use.”  The decision calls for, among other things, 1) capacity-building for States Parties to address the threat from non-state actors; 2) greater transparency of the transfer of scheduled chemicals to Syria to deter states from providing scheduled chemicals to Syria; and 3) implementation of collective measures by States Parties under Article XII, paragraph 3 of the CWC, including to take steps to prohibit and prevent the transfer of certain high risk chemicals and dual use equipment to Syria.  This is the first decision taken in the history of the OPCW to recommend States Parties take collective measures under Article XII, paragraph 3 of the CWC, demonstrating the resolve of the CSP to take incremental steps to further address the Syrian CW threat.  The decision not only addresses the continued Syrian non-compliance, but also the threat of non-state actors.  It highlights the risk of chemical weapons proliferation to all actors in Syria as well as the possibility that other states may be identified as using chemical weapons in the future.  The decision importantly requests the Technical Secretariat to report on transfers of scheduled chemicals to Syria, which will enable discussion of risks associated with such transfers at meetings of the policy-making organs of the Organization.  The decision also calls on the OPCW Director-General to bring to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council the continuing threat related to Syria’s possession and use of CW, and urges the General Assembly and Security Council to take appropriate actions to address the situation and advance accountability. 

Supplementing and reinforcing this work in the OPCW, the United States and our allies also implemented a highly effective diplomatic engagement strategy to maintain international focus on the Syrian CW issue and project the vital importance of preserving the prohibition on chemical weapons.  U.S. diplomats led this strategic outreach with countries across the globe, including through bilateral engagement with regional groups. 

The 2024-2025 OPCW budget, adopted at the 28th session of the CSP, includes funding for investigative efforts into the use of CW in Syria and was approved overwhelmingly, signaling continued broad support for the OPCW’s mandate.  The adoption of the OPCW CSP budget decisions also further highlights the isolation of Russia and others who levy attacks on the OPCW to shield the Syrian regime from accountability for CW use. 

The United States previously imposed sanctions on numerous Syrian individuals and entities for their involvement in Syria’s production and use of CW in contravention of its CWC obligations.  Where feasible, the United States will continue to explore new sanctions in coordination with allies and partners.

The United States will continue to seek accountability for the regime’s chemical weapons use and take action to urge the regime to return to compliance with the CWC in 2024.

[1] The Report by the Director-General Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 31 July 2023 also includes the “State of Palestine” in its list of States Parties that have not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures. _{[back to 1]}

[2] On May 18, 2018, the Palestinians deposited a purported instrument of accession to the CWC. On June 18, 2018, the United States submitted to the UN Secretary General, the Depositary for the CWC, a letter detailing U.S. objections to the purported accession of the “State of Palestine” to the CWC. This letter was circulated to all States Parties by the Depositary. _{[back to 2]}

[3] Fentanyl has been referred to by some as an “incapacitating agent,” but during the 2002 Moscow Dubrovka theatre hostage crisis, over 100 people were killed by aerosolized fentanyl analogs (including both civilians and hostage takers), demonstrating the potential toxicity of fentanyl and its derivatives/analogs. _{[back to 3]}

[4] Grenades produced in the 1970s by the Soviet Union to disperse the riot control agents CS. _{[back to 4]}