LAOS (Tier 2)

The Government of Laos does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Laos remained on Tier 2. These efforts included increasing investigations into trafficking cases originating in special economic zones (SEZs), opening an office of the Anti-Trafficking Department (ATD) inside one SEZ, initiating inspections of companies within SEZs, and negotiating an MOU to ensure Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) representatives had access to SEZs. The government also significantly increased the number of potential victims it removed from SEZs, identified more male victims, and significantly increased the number of victims it referred to services. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Courts did not convict any traffickers. Authorities identified fewer victims, and victim protection services were disproportionately unavailable to male victims of trafficking and members of LGBTQI+ communities. Anti-trafficking awareness and capacity among border officials in key transit areas remained low despite ongoing government training initiatives.

  • Vigorously investigate and prosecute traffickers and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms.
  • Increase efforts to proactively identify and provide protection services to men, boys, and LGBTQI+ victims of forced labor and sex trafficking.
  • Increase transnational collaboration on trafficking investigations.
  • Improve training for officials on indicators of labor trafficking, particularly among men, boys, and underserved communities.
  • Continue to disseminate, implement, and train police and border officials on the national victim protection and referral guidelines.
  • Proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable groups, including Lao and foreign workers working on large infrastructure, mining, and agricultural projects, and projects affiliated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as Lao communities displaced by these projects; Laos and foreign nationals employed in SEZs; Laos and foreign nationals exploited in forced labor in cyber scam operations; Lao labor migrants returning from work abroad through border crossings; and Lao and foreign women and girls discovered during law enforcement actions of nightclubs, karaoke bars, and other establishments that facilitate commercial sex.
  • Train law enforcement officials at the national and local level on the Lao Penal Code to improve their ability to investigate and prosecute traffickers, including complicit officials, those operating within SEZs, and child sex tourists.
  • Publicize and adequately staff all available government anti-trafficking hotlines, and train staff on victim identification and referral.
  • Further reduce barriers to formal labor migration to reduce the vulnerability of migrant workers, including eliminating worker-paid recruitment fees.
  • Continue to strengthen efforts at diplomatic missions overseas to identify and assist Lao victims of sex and labor trafficking.
  • Screen any North Korean workers for signs of trafficking and refer them to appropriate services in a manner consistent with obligations under UNSCR 2397.

 

The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 215 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million to 100 million Lao kip ($580 to $5,810); if the crime involved a child victim, the fine range increased to 100 million to 500 million Lao kip ($5,810 to $29,040). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape.

The ATD, in the Ministry of Public Security (MOPS), investigated 39 potential cases of trafficking, involving 98 suspected perpetrators from January to December 2022 (compared with 39 cases involving 77 perpetrators in 2021). Of these 39 cases, police completed the investigation of and referred to the Office of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor (OSPP) 26 cases (compared with 25 in 2021). For the second year, authorities did not provide further disaggregated case information on types of trafficking. The OSPP submitted 14 cases for prosecution, returned three cases to provincial security officials for further investigation, and revised one case with new charges; four cases remained under examination by the OSPP. This compared with the OSPP submitting 21 cases for prosecution, returning one case for further investigation, and rejecting one case in 2021. Authorities initiated court proceedings in 12 cases against 27 suspects, compared with initiating court proceedings in 13 cases against an unknown number of suspects in 2021. Authorities also continued the prosecution of nine traffickers in two cases initiated in previous years. However, courts did not convict any traffickers in 2022, compared with convicting 10 traffickers in 2021. For the second year, the government did not disaggregate convictions by type of trafficking or provide sentencing data.

The MOPS maintained police units dedicated to investigating human trafficking cases, and the government also maintained anti-trafficking units in provincial and district police departments to coordinate with the ATD. The ATD disseminated NAP implementation guidelines tailored for provincial- and district-level anti-trafficking law enforcement activities. The government did not have prosecutors or courts specifically dedicated to trafficking cases, and whether courts tried a case at the district or provincial level depended on the potential severity of the sentence. The law required cases involving charges associated with prison sentences lasting three years or more be tried at the provincial or central level.

The government increased oversight of some SEZs and cooperated with foreign governments on removing potential trafficking victims from exploitative conditions therein. In September 2022, the government established a new ATD office inside the Golden Triangle SEZ; this ATD office conducted unannounced inspections of 306 companies in the Golden Triangle SEZ and opened six trafficking cases. At least 17 cases investigated by the ATD originated in SEZs.

Officials reported they lacked the technical equipment and training to pursue the ringleaders of trafficking syndicates, and security officials often only arrested low-level members of the syndicates, including victims of forced criminality. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials for complicity in trafficking or trafficking-adjacent crimes during the year.

The government lifted COVID-19 restrictions on May 9, 2022, and anti-trafficking officials rapidly returned to pre-pandemic operations, in some cases improving response and coordination timeliness, particularly for cases originating in SEZs.

Authorities provided training on anti-trafficking laws to police officers and border officials. The Lao Women’s Union (LWU); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism; and the OSPP; in collaboration with NGOs, trained officials in provincial capitals and remote districts on trafficking prosecutions; coordination of prevention, protection, and investigation efforts; and implementation of international conventions and domestic trafficking laws. The government continued to cooperate with Cambodia, the PRC, Thailand, Vietnam, and international organizations pursuant to existing bilateral agreements and MOUs on sharing information, case investigation and prosecution, and victim repatriation. Several provinces and districts maintained and, at times, updated formal anti-trafficking cooperation agreements with Thai counterparts.

The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government identified 75 trafficking victims in 2022; 67 sex trafficking victims (five men, seven women, four boys, and 51 girls) and eight victims of forced labor (two men, two women, and four girls). This compared with identifying 110 trafficking victims in 2021. The government included forced and fraudulent marriage cases with victim identification data in past years, and these figures may have included forced and/or fraudulent marriage cases that featured corollary sex or labor trafficking indicators. Unlike in previous years, traffickers exploited the majority of these victims in Laos, with 74 of the identified trafficking victims having been removed from the Golden Triangle SEZ. Six of the identified victims were foreign nationals (one sex trafficking victim and five labor trafficking victims); compared with 18 foreign nationals identified in 2021. The central ATD was the sole authority able to formally identify trafficking victims. In practice, provincial police, immigration police, village-level authorities, the government-funded LWU, and NGOs could also screen for, identify victims, and refer them to the ATD for formal identification. ATD and other police and border officials, including those stationed near or in at-risk communities, the LWU, and the MOFA, continued to use a victim identification manual created in a prior year in conjunction with an international organization; however, the lack of consistent identification and referral practices throughout the country hindered the provision of sufficient protection services to all victims. The ATD did not report if it counted or tracked victims who declined official assistance, and some victims declined assistance during the reporting period. Officials and NGO experts noted authorities were less likely to identify men and LGBTQI+ individuals as trafficking victims, but the increased prevalence of human trafficking in cyber scam operations led to an increase in the number of male victims identified. Most central and provincial ATD officials had received victim-sensitivity training. Observers reported some security authorities discriminated against LGBTQI+ victims, and LGBTQI+ victims were at a higher risk of being arrested for commercial sex crimes without being screened for trafficking indicators. The government continued to demonstrate inconsistent victim identification measures in certain parts of the country and within specific sectors, citing jurisdictional and public health-related challenges. Authorities did not proactively screen for or identify trafficking victims at foreign-owned rubber and banana plantations, in garment factories, or working on foreign-funded infrastructure projects, all of which presented some indicators of trafficking. Authorities did not report conducting law enforcement actions of establishments facilitating commercial sex. Border officials continued to demonstrate a low capacity to detect trafficking because of insufficient staffing at international checkpoints and border crossings and a lack of training on victim identification. However, the LWU reported it, in coordination with NGOs and the ATD, screened some Lao nationals when returning through formal checkpoints.

The government, in collaboration with NGOs, provided services to 95 victims, compared with providing direct government services to 15 victims in 2021. The government, in collaboration with NGOs, provided shelter, medical care, education, vocational training, mental health counseling, financial assistance, and community reintegration support. The LWU’s Counseling and Protection Center for Women and Children provided some of these services directly; it sheltered at least 17 foreign victims, at least one of whom was an adult man. The LWU also provided counseling to trafficking victims and other vulnerable people through its hotline and via WhatsApp. In prior years, officials acknowledged male and LGBTQI+ victims of trafficking faced difficulties accessing protection services; the significant increase in male victims seeking services in 2022 overwhelmed the government’s capacity to respond, requiring IOs to assist with providing shelter for foreign male victims awaiting repatriation. The law entitled all identified victims to the full range of victim support services, regardless of gender, nationality, or where their exploitation occurred. The government provided all identified victims with temporary shelter, but temporary shelters did not have the capacity to assist all victims. In March 2023, LWU officials reported finalizing construction of a new shelter in Luang Namtha, a border area known for high incidences of trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage, that included designated space for men, women, and transgender victims; it was not yet fully operational by the end of the reporting period. The provision of shelter or other protective services was not contingent upon victims’ cooperation with law enforcement or testimony in court.

The OSPP reported victims could testify behind a curtain to protect their privacy and ensure their safety, and it had expanded availability of this service nationwide, but it did not report how many victims benefitted from the option while testifying against traffickers in 2022. The OSPP continued to collaborate with an international organization to provide judges and prosecutors with new victim-centered trial guidelines, which were not finalized by the end of the reporting period. The government reported victims could request civil compensation, including in conjunction with a criminal trial. The government did not report if courts ordered restitution paid to victims, compared with nine defendants ordered to pay 65.5 million Lao kip ($3,800) to 11 victims in 2021.

Authorities reported working with numerous foreign governments to repatriate potential trafficking victims from the Golden Triangle SEZ. Authorities did not report repatriating or providing reintegration services to Lao women and girls whom PRC nationals had subjected to forced or fraudulent marriage, which often included corollary sex trafficking and/or forced labor indicators, in the PRC (220 in 2021). They also worked with the Governments of the PRC and Thailand to repatriate 27 male and female Lao trafficking victims. The LWU and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) were responsible for providing reintegration services for trafficking victims but relied heavily on NGOs to offer such assistance. The government did not report providing legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may have faced hardships or retribution.

Many domestic victims in the Golden Triangle SEZ reached out directly to LFTU, LWU, and MOPS officials via messaging applications (apps) and foreign victims reached out to diplomatic mission representatives via social media, messaging apps, and publicly listed contact numbers. Between September and December 2022, the MOPS removed 1,802 vulnerable workers from the Golden Triangle SEZ (1,140 male workers, 662 female workers; 986 were foreign nationals from Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, the PRC, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam). Traffickers likely exploited the vast majority of these potential victims in forced labor in cyber scam operations, but the government did not report how many of these workers it formally identified as trafficking victims. The government classified most of these cases as “labor disputes,” which precluded them from accessing trafficking-related support services, although it opened 17 trafficking investigations involving an unknown number of potential victims. Labor inspections in the Golden Triangle SEZ also led the Anti-Trafficking Department Task Force to remove 797 potential victims from workplaces there in 2022.

Authorities trained Lao diplomatic officials on victim identification, trafficking indicators, and victim referral. The MLSW trained provincial- and district-level authorities on victim identification, referral, and child protection.

The government slightly increased prevention efforts. The ministerial-level National Steering Committee on Anti-Human Trafficking and the working-level National Secretariat on Anti-Human Trafficking met three times to coordinate Laos’s trafficking prevention activities. The government provided an unspecified amount of funding for anti-trafficking activities on a case-by-case basis, rather than allocating a set budget to each ministry, compared with 300 million Lao kip ($17,420) allocated to each ministry in 2020. The multisector Human Trafficking Working Group coordinated with civil society organizations and convened twice to share best practices and maintain partnerships at national and subnational levels, including in anti-trafficking enforcement in the SEZs. The government approved an English translation of the 2021-2025 NAP and disseminated it to district, provincial, and central ministry departments. The government did not make its annual progress report on implementation of the NAP publicly available.

The government conducted anti-trafficking education and outreach efforts for officials, tourism industry representatives, and local communities through social media, public posters, radio segments, and television, including a nationally broadcast weekly television program on trafficking issues. The LWU worked with the National University of Laos to provide legal guidance on trafficking and GBV cases to law students. The government also distributed anti-trafficking curriculum materials for students in grades three and up. The government provided awareness-raising sessions targeting migrant workers, communities in areas with foreign agricultural land concessions, and vulnerable border areas with a high prevalence of trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage in the PRC. The MLSW conducted some skills training and job placement services for Lao workers in an effort to discourage returned migrants from illegally seeking employment abroad. The Ministry of Education and Sport spent 1.58 billion Lao kip ($92,000) on training and materials for provincial teachers to educate students on trafficking. State-controlled media increased its reporting on trafficking cases and operations to remove workers from the Golden Triangle SEZ, and anecdotal reports indicated this helped Laos nationals convince vulnerable community members not to seek employment in the Golden Triangle SEZ. The government shared trafficking information with foreign government counterparts, the media, and the Human Trafficking Working Group.

The government maintained multiple hotlines to report incidents of trafficking, domestic abuse, GBV, child protection, and various forms of labor exploitation; authorities did not provide disaggregated information on trafficking victims identified or referred through these hotlines (unreported in 2021). Insufficient staffing and low public awareness of the hotlines’ existence limited their accessibility and effectiveness. In response to these limitations, the LWU initiated the use of social media and messaging apps to provide traditional hotline services like providing information and counseling resources.

In August 2022, the quasi-governmental LFTU negotiated an MOU with the SEZ Promotion and Management Office to improve support of workers’ rights and ensure broad awareness of labor regulations among employers and employees, particularly inside SEZs. The MOU guaranteed LFTU officials access to SEZs and required LFTU representation in all companies that employed more than 10 workers; the government reported officials could freely enter SEZs, but some business owners refused to allow LFTU officials access to workplaces. NGOs reported officials’ and social workers’ access to the Golden Triangle SEZ increased in 2022. In September 2022, the Anti-Human Trafficking Secretariat created a task force for the ATD office inside the Golden Triangle SEZ; the office began a survey of every workplace inside the Golden Triangle SEZ, conducted unannounced inspections of 306 companies, and identified six trafficking cases by the end of November 2022. This survey was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. However, after the creation of this ATD office, government officials and state-run media began to promote employment opportunities and high-quality working conditions within the Golden Triangle SEZ. Officials and NGOs reportedly continued work to terminate work contracts for SEZ employees who filed formal and informal complaints of labor abuses throughout 2022.

The formal migration process remained insufficient to prevent exploitation in sex trafficking or forced labor for many Lao migrant workers. However, the government slightly improved its oversight and regulation of labor recruitment in 2022. The MLSW ran one public Employment Service Center and oversaw 35 recruitment agencies, 33 of which could recruit for jobs abroad in Thailand, Japan, and the ROK. These recruitment agencies acted as gatekeepers to the formal migration process in Laos, and the law allowed them to charge workers recruitment fees, some of which continued to contribute to indebtedness that placed Lao workers at risk of trafficking abroad. In early 2022, officials reportedly began consultations with an international organization to reduce recruitment brokerage fees; authorities did not provide information on the status of this process during the reporting period. The government maintained bilateral labor agreements with several common destination countries, including Thailand, the PRC, Cambodia, Japan, the ROK, and Vietnam. The bilateral anti-trafficking agreement with the Government of Thailand outlined a formal labor migration process that was costly to workers, overly complex, and dissuasively time-consuming in a manner that reportedly caused many Lao migrants to opt for irregular and far more vulnerable migratory channels. Once in Thailand, these workers were further vulnerable to passport retention, wage and contract irregularities, physical abuse, and many other forced labor indicators. The MLSW continued to employ a labor attaché in Thailand who could register employment grievances of Lao workers in the country. The labor attaché received training from international organizations and the Government of Thailand before and during his assignment, but authorities did not report whether the attaché formally identified any trafficking victims there during the reporting period. Government capacity to register births and issue family books and other civil documents, particularly in remote areas of the country, remained limited and contributed to general trafficking vulnerability. The government began to modernize civil registration systems in 2021 but did not provide updates to this process, which likely suffered delays during the pandemic. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

As reported over the last five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims within Laos, and traffickers exploit victims from Laos abroad; traffickers also make use of Lao territory to transport foreign victims to other countries in the region. NGOs estimated in 2018 that 13,000 individuals in Laos are in commercial sex in established businesses and are potentially vulnerable to sex trafficking, with as many as three times that figure operating independently throughout the country. Lao farmers growing maize and cassava are reportedly more vulnerable to forced labor through indebtedness to local community leaders. With little oversight by local authorities, foreign and Lao workers at or near foreign-owned or foreign-operated agricultural operations, including banana and rubber plantations; transportation infrastructure construction sites, including those affiliated with the PRC’s BRI; and SEZs are extremely vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking. Reports indicate labor trafficking of Laos workers on agricultural plantations decreased after the pandemic, and workers have more freedom to avoid farms with undesirable working conditions. A study conducted by an international organization in 2019 reported the presence of women in commercial sex and children in sex trafficking near PRC-financed railway construction sites affiliated with the BRI. Lao communities displaced by frequent natural disasters; foreign-invested mining and construction operations, including those affiliated with the BRI; and foreign agricultural land concessions may be vulnerable to trafficking amid ensuing economic hardships.

Pandemic-related travel restrictions and border closures starting in March 2020 led hundreds of thousands of Lao migrants formally and informally working in Thailand and other countries, including Malaysia and the PRC, to return to Laos, culminating in widespread unemployment within the country and increased economic hardship for families dependent on foreign remittances. These conditions place many Lao workers into potentially exploitative situations as they traveled domestically within Laos in search of low-salary jobs, including at PRC-managed land concessions and SEZs, or illegally migrate for work abroad, particularly back to Thailand where wages are higher. Formal migration, which reopened after the pandemic, is slow, costly, and involves overly burdensome requirements that incentivize workers to rely on informal migration. Some workers from Laos migrate through Thailand to third countries such as Malaysia where they may face greater risk of trafficking. Observers report the number of informal migrants to Thailand increased above pre-pandemic levels. Police observed the closure of the Laos-Thailand border during the pandemic increased local demand for commercial sex.

Increasingly, traffickers use the internet and social media to fraudulently recruit men, women, and children from Laos and other countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and South America for high-paying technical jobs abroad and force them to engage in online gambling, internet, cryptocurrency, and telephone scams, primarily in casinos and commercial compounds in Laos, including in SEZs. In Laos, traffickers often target young people from rural areas where there is a discrepancy between the high level of education available and the low level of job opportunities. Foreign victims are often lured to Thailand with false job offers, and traffickers transport them across the border into SEZs located in Laos, often by boat. Traffickers subject these workers to punishment for poor performance and disobedience, including but not limited to physical abuse, wage-docking, and debt-bondage, and may “resell” those who cannot meet sales quotas or repay recruitment debts to other criminal networks for forced labor in similar fraud schemes, domestic servitude, or sex trafficking. In 2022, workers from more than 20 countries accused employers in the Golden Triangle SEZ of human trafficking and labor exploitation in cyber scam operations. Some of these cyber scam operations are likely run by PRC national-operated crime syndicates. The pandemic-related closure of garment factories in 2021 and a significant downturn in the tourism industry led to widespread disproportionate unemployment among Lao women who were increasingly vulnerable to predatory recruitment practices as a result. Against this backdrop, SEZ casinos have used social media to lure hundreds of Lao women to work as “chat girls” – online representatives selling casino stock to male customers – with false promises of high salaries, free meals, and free accommodations. Many of these women do not meet the unattainably high sales quotas set by the casino managers and are forced to incur debt to pay the difference, as well as to pay for meals and accommodations; casino managers leverage this debt to confine them and subject them to forced labor and sex trafficking. Foreign nationals operate pornography and child pornography rings in Laos that subject adult and child victims to sex trafficking, child sex trafficking, and labor trafficking. Reports indicate child sex tourists from the UK, Australia, and the United States have traveled to Laos for the purpose of exploiting child sex trafficking victims.

Some Burmese, PRC, Russian, Thai, and Vietnamese nationals are reportedly subjected to sex trafficking in the Golden Triangle SEZ where thousands of undocumented migrant workers are also vulnerable to forced labor in debt-based coercion. Other reports indicate Burmese nationals working as manual laborers or involved in commercial sex near the Lao portion of the Golden Triangle may be victims of trafficking. Laos and foreign nationals, including migrant workers from the PRC, experience conditions indicative of forced labor at PRC-owned mining companies. Traffickers also exploit Vietnamese, PRC national, and Lao women and children in sex trafficking in larger Lao cities and near national borders, casinos, and other SEZs, reportedly to meet the demand of international tourists and migrant workers.

During pandemic-related border closures, traffickers deceived some local communities into believing that Laos’s international borders had reopened to lure them into sex trafficking and forced labor abroad. Traffickers targeted Lao labor migrants from the southern part of the country in particular. Some victims migrate with the assistance of legal or illegal brokers charging fees; this is increasingly occurring under the direction of Lao intermediaries working with foreign traffickers. Others move independently through Laos’s 27 official border crossings using valid travel documents. Many of these border crossings are managed by provincial- or district-level immigration authorities with less formal training and limited hours of operation, making them easier transit points for traffickers to facilitate the movement of Lao victims into neighboring countries. Traffickers in rural communities often lure Lao women and girls with false promises of legitimate work opportunities or promises of marriage – typically through the use of marriage brokers – to nationals in neighboring countries, primarily the PRC, and then subject them to sex trafficking, forced labor, and forced concubinage leading to forced childbearing. This trend reportedly increased after completion of the Lao-China Railway but fluctuated during pandemic-related travel restrictions and border closures; traffickers also use other methods to transport Lao victims overland through Thailand en route to the PRC for these purposes. Brokered marriages between rural Lao women and PRC men employed at SEZs known for trafficking vulnerabilities have also increased during the pandemic. Children from economically disadvantaged rural areas are especially vulnerable to trafficking, given the legal work age of 14, the widespread closure of schools during the pandemic, and the lure of higher wages abroad. Traffickers exploit a large number of Lao women and girls in Thailand in commercial sex and forced labor in domestic service, factories, or agriculture. According to Thailand-based public health organizations, traffickers take advantage of the undocumented immigration status of some Lao men and boys to subject them to sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Lao men and boys in forced labor in Thailand’s fishing, construction, and agricultural industries. Lao men are also subjected to forced labor on fishing vessels operating in Indonesian territorial waters. Companies operating under the auspices of the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” have exploited Lao nationals in forced labor, in agriculture, and several other sectors. Lao women and girls are reportedly vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking at “girl bars” – entertainment sites advertising paid “accompaniment” services often involving sex acts with young women and girls – in urban areas in Japan. North Koreans in Laos may be operating under exploitative working conditions and display multiple indicators of forced labor.

U.S. Department of State

The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future