MODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome our participants dialing in from the Asia Pacific region and around the world for this on-the-record briefing with U.S. Army General James H. Dickinson, Commander of the U.S. Space Command, the 11th and newest unified combatant command.

General Dickinson will discuss his recent travel to the Indo-Pacific to meet with allies and partners to advance collaboration and information-sharing on space security topics.  He will take questions from participating journalists.

I’ll now turn it over to General Dickinson for his opening remarks.  Sir, the floor is yours.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Well, thank you, Katie, and thanks to everybody for dialing in to participate in today’s call from, quite frankly, across the globe.

So today I’m calling in from Hawaii.  I just spent the last several days in New Zealand participating in the Combined Space Operations Principals Board, an annual event that, quite frankly, brings us together – brings together counterparts from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and, of course, the United States, with a focus, quite frankly, on advancing collaboration and information-sharing on space security topics.

So we know is that allied integration serves to provide a safe, sustainable, and secure space domain for all of us, and it’s certainly not a new topic for any of us, but a topic that’s becoming ever more important and critical for our global way of life.  So a secure space domain really underpins all instruments of national power.  Nations around the world share in the benefits and costs of human activity beyond our planet, and, quite frankly, I think we can agree that it’s very exciting what we’re seeing today in the civil and commercial space markets.

And while this week’s events brought together leaders from around the globe, it’s certainly appropriate to have an event like this hosted in the Indo-Pacific given the Department of Defense’s acknowledgment as the primary theater of operations.

So for me personally, I’ve been the Commander for U.S. Space Command – had the honor of being the Commander for U.S. Space Command – for just over two years now, and it was really an honor to have the New Zealand Defence Force host this year’s event.  New Zealand is an important leader in the Pacific and a key contributor to global security and a valuable military partner.  For me personally, this is my first visit to the country, though my second trip to the Pacific region in this calendar year alone, having traveled and met with my counterparts in Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea earlier this spring.  I’ve also had the privilege to host many of our allies and partners in Colorado, where my command is headquartered today, specifically in Colorado Springs.

So our mission is quite incredible.  U.S. Space Command conducts operations in, from, and to space to deter conflict and, if necessary, defeat aggression.  We also deliver (inaudible) combat power to the joint and combined force and defend U.S. vital interests with our allies and partners.  We operate the most exquisite and extensive space surveillance and sensor network in the world today, and we observe the space and terrestrial domains 24/7 for threats, and we have the ability to detect, characterize, and attribute launches and detonations anywhere in the world.

But our operational approach is joint, combined, and partnered – because our mission success relies on relationships we build with the joint force, our U.S. Government agencies, industry, academia, and, most importantly, our allies and partners across the globe.  So today we have more than 30 space situational awareness data-sharing agreements with our allies and international partners, which are foundational in promoting – in promoting a safe, stable, sustainable, and secure space environment.

Our AOR, area of responsibility, is equally impressive as it encompasses the entire globe and the surrounding space.  Our command is both a functional and what we call an astrographic combatant command, a multidomain combatant command with assets dispersed on and above the surface of the Earth, 100 kilometers to the edge of space.

As the United States newest U.S. combatant command – I think that was said earlier – responsible for arguably the largest AOR, it’s a privilege to be visiting the Indo-Pacific as Admiral Aquilino and his team culminate a year-long celebration as the oldest and largest combatant command – 75 years.  So congratulations to Indo-Pacific Command.

And like INDOPACOM, I’m seriously focused on our pacing challenge: China.  A unified stance by allies and partners is critical to countering the coercion and subversion that threatens the international rules-based order here in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.  And as the events in Ukraine demonstrate, the value of space has been proven out.  It is clearly a contested domain that must be protected.  It’s a role that we at U.S. Space Command take very seriously.

We also recognize the importance of safeguarding the space domain for the advancement of science and human exploration.  So another role we take seriously is our partnership with NASA as the DOD manager for human spaceflight support.  And after I depart here in Hawaii, I’m excited to travel to San Diego during a couple of days to observe the splashdown and recovery of the Artemis I capsule.  The Department of Defense has a long history of partnering with NASA and supporting spaceflight programs spanning more than 60 years.  We provide specialized support to NASA which includes search and rescue of astronauts, the recovery of manned spaceflight assets, and the prepositioning of our rescue forces.  We also support NASA by providing space domain awareness of manmade and natural objects in space for the safety of the International Space Station and – the International Space Station and the domain at large.

So I’m very grateful for all of your time today and I look forward to your questions.

MODERATOR:  Thank you, General Dickinson.  We will now begin the question and answer portion of today’s call.

Our first question goes to Nhu Nguyen in Vietnam, who asks:  “What are the  biggest concerns on the current space security agenda in the Indo-Pacific region?”

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Well, so that’s a great question.  And I’ve got to tell you that when I think about that question, I think to myself about, quite frankly, how congested the domain has become over the last two-and-a-half to three years.  So let me give you a kind of a snapshot or some facts.

So when U.S. Space Command re-established itself back in 2019, we on a daily basis tracked about 25,000 pieces of debris or objects in space.  So that’s anything from an active satellite to a satellite that’s not functioning anymore to just pieces of debris that exist in the domain, and that was back two-and-a-half to three years ago.  Today that number is about 48,000.  Just think of the increase just from 25,000 to 48,000 just in, what, two-and-a-half to three years.

And what the represents in terms of congestion in the space domain: most of that debris is in the low Earth orbit, and in the low Earth orbit that’s where we do most of our space operations – not only from a military perspective but from a commercial and civil perspective.  So when you look at the International Space Station, it flies in the low Earth orbit.  The new Chinese space station flies in the low Earth orbit as well as the Hubble telescope, for example, plus many commercial types of satellites that provide communications and other services to our economies, whether it’s the U.S. economy or economy writ large around the world.

So when you look at just that amount of debris, you can imagine the congestion that brings with that and, quite frankly, the risk at which those satellites are operating in that orbit.

MODERATOR:  All right.  The next question goes to Song Sangho of Yonhap News Agency in Seoul.  Operator, please open the line.

QUESTION:  Hello, can you hear me?  Hello, can you hear me?

MODERATOR:  I can hear you.

QUESTION:  Yes, my question is, as you know very well, the U.S. Space Forces-Korea is planned to be launched here in Korea pretty soon.  The expectation here is the new operation as launched here in Korea will help better monitor and track North Korean missile and nuclear activities.  But beyond the mission of addressing North Korean threats, does the U.S. Space Forces-Korea have any other mission related to China threat or any other regional challenges, or is it exclusively for North Korean threat?  Thank you.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  I’m sorry, is it exclusively what?

QUESTION:  Or is the Space Forces-Korea exclusively for North Korean threat?

GENERAL DICKINSON:  So that’s – the element that you described that is standing up is part of the United States Space Force, and that is very characteristic.  That particular element that stands up is very common, or will become very common across the entire U.S. joint force.

So one of the things when U.S. Space Command stood up, as well as the United States Space Force when they stood up, was our responsibility was how do we put space expertise within each of these regional combatant commands – so Indo-Pacific, USFK, EUCOM, CENTCOM – how do we put space expertise at the lowest levels so that they are able to leverage space capabilities and utilize space capabilities with regards to whatever they’re seeing in their respective areas of operation.

So having that capability at USFK in South Korea will enhance our ability to provide space-enabling capabilities for the forces on the South Korean – on the peninsula there in South Korea.  And so it’s a good-news story in that we will continue to put more space expertise throughout the U.S. joint force so they’re able to provide those capabilities to the warfighter.

MODERATOR:  Great.  The next question goes to Maha Siddiqui of NDTV in India.  Operator, please open the line.

QUESTION:  General Dickinson, many thanks for doing this.  I want to know in the context of the threat, the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific that you referred to, has there been any specific cooperation with India, especially with the India standoff that China started at the (inaudible) in 2020?

GENERAL DICKINSON:  I’m sorry, so I understand your question is what is our cooperation with India?

QUESTION:  Yes, and especially with regards to the Chinese threat (inaudible) and specifically during the time of the standoff between India and China that started in 2020 as the line of actual control (inaudible) cooperation in identifying the positions of the Chinese army?

GENERAL DICKINSON:  I would just say that as we look to the future, it’s all about creating that cooperation amongst the nations that – the spacefaring nations that respect the fact that our domain needs to be safe, secure, and stable.  And so as we look to the future and we look at the activities that the Chinese are having or conducting in the space domain, we – just like I came out of this conference earlier this week, the CSpO – it’s all about bringing our allies and partners together so that we have a common understanding of the space domain.

MODERATOR:  Okay.  Our next question will go to Alastair Gale of The Wall Street Journal, based in Japan.  Operator, please open the line.

QUESTION:  General, thank you for doing this.  I’m based in Tokyo, and here in Japan the government is going to come up with a new national security strategy which is widely expected to sanction the use of long-range strike against enemy bases.  And my question to you is:  What role would the U.S. Space Command play in terms of targeting and guidance if Japan was to adopt this capability?  Thank you.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Well, hey, thank you for the question.  I mean, I think we – I know you clearly understand how close and how important a strategic partner Japan and the USA have been for many, many years, and, quite frankly, in many other domains, right?  So if you look at air, land, sea domains, how close we have been and partnered with them for many, many years.  And it’s very analogous to what we’re doing with them on the space domain right now.

I had the honor of coming to Japan not too long ago as they stood up their space operations there in Japan, which is really a great indicator of their recognition of how important space is, not only for their economy and for their civil population, but also for military operations.  And so as we look to build a future with Japan, space is a very important piece.  In fact, we just had General Yamazaki, the chief of defense from Japan, in Colorado Springs about a month or two months – month, month-and-a-half ago where we were talking about space.

So we look to that relationship as important, or as – yeah, as critical as we have in the other domains with the space domain.  And so as we look to your specific question, the architecture that we have today that provides space-enabling capabilities to the warfighter, it’s the same as we have done for many years in the past with global positioning capabilities as well as early warning, missile warning type of technologies as well as satellite communications.  So we look to that not only today but in the future as well.

MODERATOR:  All right.  Next we will go to a question received in advance.  This question goes to Tran Hoang of Zing News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Given the recent reports that China is planning to build a nuclear energy station in space and a moon mission, and China and Russia are cooperating for space missions, how will the U.S. respond to this space race?”

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Well, in terms of a space race, I don’t know if I would categorize that as a space race.  We understand that the Chinese and the Russians are proliferating in space, but it’s one of those things where you look at what are they actually doing in terms of capabilities that they’re putting in the space domain.  I would just tell you that we continue to watch that very carefully.  I mean, we are watching to make sure that we are able to monitor that, understand that, as well as being able to characterize that.

So I don’t know if I would categorize it as a space race.  I think it’s more of they’re continuing to proliferate and to provide capabilities to their military as well as their economy.  So in terms of an actual space race, I wouldn’t agree that we’re actually in a space race.

MODERATOR:  Our next question will go to Bill Faries of Bloomberg News, based in Singapore.  Operator, please open the line.

QUESTION:  Thank you, General.  Thank you for having this today.  I had actually two questions, but one I suspect will have a very brief answer.  I wanted to ask if you have – there’s any kind of communication at all that you have with your counterparts in China, either, I guess, in the PLA or maybe in the government itself.

And then the second question was about Taiwan.  The government there has said as kind of an emergency backup they would like to have improved access to communications satellites, and they specifically talked about trying to be able to tap high-speed satellite communications systems in some kind of an emergency, whether a natural disaster that affects the subsea cables they rely on for internet access or even some kind of a conflict.  And I’m just wondering is – whether – what kind of work you do with Taiwan to help them in terms of satellite communications.  Thank you.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Yeah, I think you probably saw in the news the Secretary of Defense just had an engagement with his counterpart in China.  And so I think as they look at the future, that’s a great first step, if you will, in terms of communicating and building that relationship.

I will tell you that we don’t directly work with Taiwan in terms of satellite communications.  Again, that’s something that we look to the INDOPACOM to do some of that work.  But we traditionally don’t necessarily work directly with them for satellite communications.

MODERATOR:  The next question goes to Robert Jacob Lazaro of The Philippine Daily Inquirer in the Philippines.  Operator, please open the line.

QUESTION:  Hello, can you hear me?

MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  I can hear you.

QUESTION:  All right.  I just wanted to ask how the Philippines can be involved or be helped in terms of its conflict in the South China Sea, especially recently that the Chinese ships have moved closer to establish what they call their territory.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Well, I think when I look at that, we – I look at it through the lens of you all out here in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility.  I look at space from a global perspective.  And so we look at it from the global satellite communications and global missile warning, global positioning and navigation perspective, and so really – so as we look at that problem set, it’s through the lens of a global perspective, not necessarily a regional perspective.

MODERATOR:  All right.  Our next question goes to Srinjoy Chowdhury of Times Now TV in India.  Operator, please open the line.

QUESTION:  Good morning, General.  My question is simply this: is China trying to weaponize space?  And if it is, what are the things China is doing or planning to do?

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Well, I think I look at it through the lens of being congested, competitive, and contested.  And so we’ve just seen over the years in terms of their advancement in space capabilities, we – starting out in 2007 when we saw the direct ascent ASAT test that they conducted, in terms of creating the debris field that I mentioned to you earlier in this interview or this session, in terms of making the domain more congested.  They continue to build and build capabilities that really, quite frankly, hold most of our assets at risk in the space domain.  So it really is an advancement, if you will, in their capabilities.  They’re understanding that space is a very important piece to not only their economic or the global economic environment, but also the military environment.  So we continue to watch that very closely as they continue to increase capabilities.

MODERATOR:  All right.  Our final question will go to one received in advance from Christopher Woody of Insider, based in the United States.  He asks:  “How would you rate China’s ability at this moment to use its space-based assets to conduct monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces, particularly of U.S. naval forces in the Indo-Pacific theater?”

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Yeah, I think we’ve been very clear in several of these events in terms of what their capabilities are.  What we continue to do from our perspective is how do we build that coalition, those allies and partners that can bring capabilities to bear and an understanding of what we want to be able to do in terms of the space domain, in terms of maintaining a safe, secure, and a stable environment.  So really, as we look to the future, just like in the other domains it’s really the power of the coalition of our allies and partners that’s what’s gives us the capabilities that we need in order to look at what competitors are doing in the space domain.

MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, General Dickinson, if you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back over to you.

GENERAL DICKINSON:  Sure.  Well, thanks, Katie.  So, I mean, I appreciate everybody’s time today, and I know everybody is busy.  I’ve just got to say that as I look to what I saw today in the news, I just think it is a very powerful message – that I think we had a UN resolution that was approved today – I think it was like 155 countries, I think, that said that they all believe that destructive direct ascent ASAT missile testing is not what we want, and their very much approval in terms of making sure that that is condemned and not part of what we do today.  And that really kind of links back to what I started off with at the beginning of this session, which is we just – we can’t contribute – can’t continue to contribute to the debris that we find in the space domain, as I mentioned, most of which is in the low Earth orbit, if we’re going to have an economic – freedom of economics around the world, et cetera.  Businesses, et cetera – they all depend upon space and our ability to preserve that space domain is absolutely critical.

So I really – I’m excited about the fact that this resolution was approved today, and of course we’ve had several countries before this that actually have approved it themselves.  So again, I think that’s very powerful.  Again, it shows the collective understanding and support to making sure that we have a secure, safe, and stable domain.

So, again, I appreciate everybody’s time today and really have enjoyed my time out here in the Indo-Pacific and look forward to heading out to the Artemis for when we see the splashdown hopefully on Sunday.  So, again, thank you for your time.

MODERATOR:  That concludes today’s call.  I would like to thank General Dickinson for joining us and thank all of our callers for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, you can contact the Asia Pacific Media Hub at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thank you and have a great day.

U.S. Department of State

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