Under Secretary Jenkins’ Remarks at the Korea Society on Deterring North Korea

Good afternoon, everyone.  I want to start by thanking the Korea Society for inviting me to speak today at such a significant moment for the U.S.-ROK Alliance.  

I want to highlight that we marked a historic milestone last year: the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.  As an alliance we are growing ever stronger in the face of new and evolving threats. 

In 2023, the same year as this milestone, we observed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continue its unprecedented pace of ballistic missile launches, in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and at enormous cost to its own people.  They began 2024 much the same way they ended 2023, with an intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) test on January 15 and several cruise missile tests. 

The DPRK has also engaged in threatening and irresponsible rhetoric regarding its weapons programs, including by characterizing some of its missile launches and other military activities as trial runs for the use of nuclear weapons. 

Each missile launches and nuclear saber-rattling speech demonstrates the DPRK’s determination to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs, underscoring the importance of growing and adapting our Alliance with the Republic of Korea to better prepare to defend against potential attacks including nuclear employment.  

The U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea remains ironclad, and our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  The Biden Administration is pursuing a calibrated response to the DPRK’s escalatory actions based on the degree of threat they pose to the United States and our allies.

Enhancing and strengthening extended deterrence with the Republic of Korea is a priority of this Administration.  In 2023, we took significant steps toward this goal.  Last April, President Biden and President Yoon announced the Washington Declaration, which established the new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and called for increased military exercises, simulations, and enhancing the visibility of strategic asset deployments to the Korean Peninsula.  These steps illustrate President Biden’s and President Yoon’s resolve to address the DPRK’s dangerous and destabilizing activities and rhetoric through a stronger deterrence effort.

The NCG met twice in 2023, once in Seoul and once in Washington.  At these meetings, both sides recognized that U.S.-ROK nuclear deterrence cooperation has deepened as progress has been achieved through frequent meetings of the NCG Working Group (WG) on NCG workstreams that include guidelines; security and information sharing protocols; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; strategic communications, exercises, simulations, and training; and risk reduction practices. 

The NCG has also allowed us to deepen cooperation, learning, and engagement among our interagency counterparts.  One key example is the Extended Nuclear Deterrence Immersion Course that the United States hosted this past November in Washington for interagency colleagues from the ROK government. 

In addition to establishing the NCG, the United States and Republic of Korea re-convened annual meetings of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in 2022 after a 4-year hiatus.  

State co-chairs the EDSCG with the Department of Defense.  The forum is valuable and unique for enabling conversation about the holistic security challenges facing the Alliance in the Indo-Pacific region.  It is also mutually complementary with the NCG and other alliance bodies. 

In the fourth meeting of the EDSCG, held last September, my co-chairs and I reaffirmed the commitment of our nations to use all available levers—including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools – to reinforce the U.S. security commitment to the ROK.  We are dedicated to a whole-of-government approach that considers military capabilities, strategic messaging, and risk reduction measures. 

Through these and other efforts to enhance extended deterrence, the United States and ROK are taking prudent steps in the face of advancing DPRK nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its destabilizing and dangerous rhetoric. It is important to recall U.S. policy on this issue:  Any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its allies is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime, and any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met with a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response

I want to emphasize the enduring commitment of both the United States and the Republic of Korea to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the bedrock of the global nuclear order.  The ROK government has been clear in its rejection of any intent to develop an independent nuclear arsenal and continues to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and the ironclad U.S. commitment to the security of the ROK. 

The United States recognizes that in today’s security environment, our efforts to maintain and strengthen deterrence must be paralleled by a continued charge toward diplomacy and dialogue to resolve difficult security challenges.  As such, both the United States and the Republic of Korea remain steadfast in our pursuit of dialogue with the DPRK, without preconditions, and see diplomacy as the only viable means of achieving a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.  Thank you.