Report to the Senate on the Status of Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons Negotiations Pursuant to Subparagraph (a)(12)(B) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty

This report is transmitted pursuant to subparagraph (a)(12)(B) of the December 22, 2010, Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (“New START Treaty”).  This report covers calendar year 2023.

On November 2, 2011, the President delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to submit the report specified in subparagraph (a)(12)(B) of the Resolution.  On December 14, 2011, the Secretary of State delegated this authority to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

This annual report on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) lays out the steps the United States has taken in 2023 toward these objectives.¹  Previous annual reports have detailed the steps the United States has taken in previous years.  

When the United States extended the New START Treaty for five years until February 5, 2026, Secretary of State Blinken stated:  “The United States will use the time provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”  The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirms, “The United States is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026, although negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith.”  On June 2, 2023, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated, “the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.  We are prepared to enter into those discussions.” 

U.S. objectives for arms control after the New START Treaty include limiting Russian systems covered under the New START Treaty; limiting the new kinds of nuclear weapons that Russia is developing and deploying; and addressing all Russian nuclear weapons, including its nonstrategic and non-deployed weapons.

U.S. arms control policy is complementary to its maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent to deter Russia from employing its nuclear weapons, including limited use of such weapons.  The 2022 NPR emphasizes “deterring Russian limited nuclear use in a regional conflict is a high U.S. and NATO priority.”  To accomplish this objective, the NPR highlighted ongoing U.S. efforts to “bolster the Triad with capabilities that further strengthen regional deterrence, such as F-35A dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) equipped with the B61-12 bomb; the W76-2 warhead; and the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon.”  These capabilities are intended to help prevent miscalculation by Russia’s leadership on the consequences of nuclear employment on any scale, including nonstrategic nuclear arms.

Like prior Administrations, the Biden Administration believes that the United States need not match nor mimic Russia’s NSNW stockpile.  Russia’s estimated stockpile of roughly 1,000 to 2,000 NSNW warheads includes but is not limited to warheads for air-to-surface missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-ballistic missile systems, and nuclear mines, as well as nuclear warheads for Russia’s dual-capable ground-launched missile systems.  Those numbers include systems not covered by the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), such as nuclear warheads for the SSC-8 intermediate-range cruise missile.  Russia’s production, flight-testing, and possession of the SSC-8 missile violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (the INF Treaty) while that treaty was in force, and ultimately led to the treaty’s termination.  

On June 25, 2022, Russia’s President Putin announced:  “[W]e will transfer to Belarus the Iskander-M tactical missile systems, which are known to use both ballistic and cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear.”  He subsequently announced on March 25, 2023, that Russia had transferred the nuclear-capable missile systems to Belarus, and further indicated Russia’s intention to base nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Belarus, stating, “We have handed over to Belarus our … Iskander system that can carry [nuclear weapons] ….  On July 1 we will complete the construction of a special storage for tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory.”  On June 14, 2023, the leader of Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, said that Belarus had received nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Russia, stating “[w]e have missiles and bombs that we have received from Russia. The bombs are three times more powerful than those [dropped on] Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”  Putin subsequently stated that Russia had already assisted Belarus in refitting existing Su-25 aircraft for readiness to use nuclear weapons.  Lukashenka has made concerning statements that he would have control over the nuclear weapons in Belarus, such as his July 6, 2023, statement that “[c]ontrol is carried out perfectly, jointly by Belarusians and Russians.”  However, Russian officials have stated that Russia retains custody and control of its nuclear weapons stationed on Belarusian territory.  The United States continues to monitor reports of the Russia-Belarus arrangement, in particular to assess and confirm that Russia maintains custody and control of its nuclear weapons at all times, such that both countries uphold their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  The United States has not seen any reason to adjust its own nuclear posture because of events to date, nor any indication that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon.  Russia’s announced deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus is unjustified and destabilizing.  It also demonstrates Russia’s hypocrisy in criticizing NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.

In public speeches in 1991 and 1992, the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union (and Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) pledged, as a political commitment, to take separate but related steps regarding reductions in the number and deployment of their “tactical” nuclear weapons.  These unilateral pledges are referred to as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.  In an October 5, 1991, televised address, President Gorbachev pledged that the Soviet Union would take a number of steps.  These included, among other things, eliminating and ceasing production of all nuclear warheads for ground-launched tactical missiles and eliminating all nuclear mines.  These unilateral pledges are referred to as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs).  Because Russia had already committed under the INF Treaty (in force from June 1988 to August 2019) to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges of 500 km to 5,500 km, we consider Russia’s PNI pledge to eliminate nuclear warheads for ground-launched “tactical” missiles to mean warheads for systems such as the SS-26 with a range under 500 km.

The United States assesses that Russia is not adhering to all of the political commitments it made in the 1991-1992 PNIs.²  Russia did not fulfill its pledge to cease production of nuclear warheads for ground-based missiles with a range under 500 km.  As noted above, in 2022 and 2023 Putin publicly acknowledged that Russia has nuclear warheads for the SS-26/Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)³, a ground-launched tactical missile.  This directly contradicts the PNI pledges Russia made not to produce nuclear warheads for ground-launched tactical missiles.  In a May 22, 2020, interview, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov claimed, “Russia’s presidential initiatives have been fulfilled completely.”  Russia’s assertions that it is implementing all of its PNI commitments are false. 

Russia has provided little information substantiating the full implementation of its PNI pledges.  Even before Putin’s statement, Russian officials had made a series of public statements that said either explicitly or implicitly that Russia possesses nuclear warheads for certain ground-launched tactical missiles fielded by Russia’s Ground Forces, particularly the SS-26.  General-Lieutenant Buzhinskiy of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) International Affairs Directorate told the United States in 2005 that Russia was revisiting some of its pledges on NSNW and that he “could not say that Russia … would implement all of its PNI pledges.”  This was a change in tone from statements before 2003, in which Russian officials still held out the possibility that all PNI initiatives – including cessation of production of nuclear warheads for ground-launched tactical missiles – would be implemented.  In November 2018, the Russian military’s TV channel, TVZvesda, reported both the SS-26/Iskander SRBM and the SSC-7 cruise missile can carry up to a 50 kiloton nuclear warhead.  In November 2019, the Russian MoD noted that the Iskander complex can carry a nuclear warhead in a website announcement that a missile brigade unit in western Russia was receiving Iskander equipment to replace its SS-21s.  The United States assesses Russia has produced nuclear warheads for the SS-26 SRBM.    

Russia’s active stockpile has also continued to include nuclear mines, which Russia pledged to destroy in the PNIs.  

Russia has admitted it has developed and fielded nuclear-capable versions of its ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which are ground-launched tactical missiles within the meaning of the PNIs.

While Russia today has fewer NSNW than in 1991, Russia continues to modernize its NSNW forces.  Meanwhile, the number of U.S. NSNW has declined by more than 90 percent since President George H.W. Bush announced the first set of U.S. PNIs in September 1991, and the active U.S. NSNW arsenal contains just one type:  the B61 gravity bomb.  

On October 27, 2022, the Administration publicly released its NPR, which describes U.S. nuclear strategy, policy, posture, and forces in support of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.  The review details U.S. concerns that Russia could use its NSNW to try to win a war on its periphery or avoid defeat if it was in danger of losing a conventional war. 

As the NPR notes, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine underscores that nuclear dangers persist, and could grow, in an increasingly competitive and volatile geopolitical landscape.  Russia’s unprovoked and unlawful further invasion of Ukraine since 2022 is a stark reminder of nuclear risk in contemporary conflict.  Russia has conducted its aggression against Ukraine under a nuclear shadow characterized by irresponsible saber-rattling, and public rhetoric regarding nuclear escalation.  Russia’s claimed deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus in 2023 is yet more evidence of Moscow’s attempts to leverage its nuclear arsenal to sow division and intimidate.    

Irresponsible Russian statements and actions raise the risk of deliberate or unintended escalation.  The United States has and will continue to point out that any adversary employment of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, create the potential for uncontrolled escalation, and have strategic effects.  Russia’s leaders should have no doubt regarding the resolve of the United States to both resist nuclear coercion and act as a responsible nuclear power.  Russian employment of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited, would carry grave consequences.  President Biden noted on October 25, 2022, that Russia would be making an “incredibly serious mistake” if it used NSNW.

Beyond the critical role deterrence plays, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation are indispensable in further reducing nuclear dangers.  Arms control can come in the form of legally binding agreements or political arrangements, and such agreements and arrangements can include arms limitation measures, risk reduction measures, and/or confidence- and security-building measures.  Deterrence and arms control are mutually reinforcing tools for preserving stability, preventing aggression and escalation, and avoiding arms racing and nuclear war.  As such, the United States places renewed emphasis on arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and risk reduction.  

Russia historically has detailed several preconditions for arms control negotiations on NSNW:  that the United States first remove its forward-based nuclear weapons from NATO Allied territory in Europe, dismantle associated U.S. infrastructure, and eliminate its training of NATO Allies related to those weapons.  Russian officials in 2023 continued to trot out various combinations of these preconditions in public remarks and at international fora.  As has been made clear to Russia for decades, these preconditions are unacceptable to the United States and NATO. 

The United States has made clear it is willing to engage on a post-2026 arms control framework with Russia.  Russia has, however, attempted to link engagement on nuclear arms control, including any New START Treaty follow-on framework, to U.S. support for Ukraine.  On July 21, 2023, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov said, “on the basis that the Americans are now proposing, we are not ready to conduct this dialogue and will not…We must first of all make sure that the U.S. course, which is fundamentally hostile towards Russia, is changing for the better for us….Both Ukraine and what is happening around it.”  In late 2023, Russia informed the United States that its position had not changed.  The United States has made clear that Russia’s attempted linkage of arms control and Ukraine will not diminish U.S. support for Ukraine.   

Russia’s ongoing violations of the New START Treaty add a further significant impediment to further progress in nuclear arms control.  In February 2023, Russia purported to suspend the New START Treaty.  The United States has assessed that this purported suspension is not legally valid, and Russia remains bound by its obligations.  Russia is failing to comply with a number of those obligations.  

The United States will continue efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear war, which would have grave consequences for the United States and the world.  We remain willing to engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia without preconditions, albeit not without accountability.  As President Biden said at this year’s UN General Assembly, “The United States is going to continue to pursue good-faith efforts to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction and lead by example, no matter what else is happening in the world.”   A factor in any future negotiations with Russia will be the size and scale of the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear weapons buildup.   

The U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitment to allies remains rock solid.  Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture will be taken only after a thorough review within—and decision by—the Alliance.  The United States is committed to consulting closely with NATO Allies and our allies in the Indo-Pacific about the security challenges posed by Russia’s NSNW and how they should be addressed.   

The Administration shares the longstanding bipartisan interest in addressing Russia’s NSNW.  Russia remains opposed.  On June 16, 2023, President Putin declared, “We have more such nuclear weapons than NATO countries.  They know about it and never stop trying to persuade us to start nuclear reduction talks.  Like hell we will …. It is our competitive advantage.”  Going forward, Russian willingness to engage on arms control including NSNW will likely be limited by how important Moscow views such weapons to be to its national security.  Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its military strategy may become even stronger in light of the substantial conventional losses and setbacks inflicted on Russian military forces in Ukraine.  Nonetheless, the Administration remains committed to seeking arms control that addresses Russia’s NSNW, and will continue working toward that objective as conditions permit, including having a willing partner prepared to act in good faith. 

[1] Although the terms “nonstrategic” and “tactical” do not have legal definitions in this context, “nonstrategic” is sometimes used to refer to weapons that cannot travel intercontinental ranges. Weapons constrained by the New START Treaty can travel intercontinental ranges and are referred to as strategic, and are not subject to this report. The United States no longer uses the term “tactical nuclear weapons” because the United States does not envision any use of nuclear weapons to be tactical in character or effect. The United States also views the term nonstrategic as a misnomer as the use of a nuclear weapon would fundamentally change the nature of a conflict, but continues to use the term in the context of this report as the generally accepted term describing those weapons that do not travel intercontinental ranges. _{[back to 1]}

[2] The United States continues to monitor Russia’s adherence to its PNI commitments, despite the lack of any legal compliance obligation on the part of Russia.  To more appropriately account for the PNIs’ status as unilateral political commitments relating in large part to NSNW systems and to place U.S. efforts related to Russia’s PNIs adherence within the larger context of U.S. efforts to address Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the United States moved its voluntary reporting on Russia’s PNIs adherence from the annual arms control Compliance Report to this annual report, beginning with the report transmitted in 2023. _{[back to 2]}

[3] The U.S. Intelligence Community defines “short range” as from 300 km to less than 1000 km. _{[back to 3]}